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Crew Aiding and Automation: A System Concept for Terminal
Area Operations, and Guidelines for Automation Design
John P. Dwyer
McDonnell Douglas Aerospace
Advanced Transport Aircraft Development
SUMMARY
This research and development program comprised two sets of technical efforts:
The development of a set of guidelines for the design of automated systems, with
particular emphasis on automation design that takes advantage of contextual
information; and the concept-level design of a crew aiding system -- the Terminal
Area Navigation Decision Aiding Mediator (TANDAM). This concept outlines a
system capable of organizing navigation and communication information and
assisting the crew in executing the operations required in descent and approach.
This design concept exemplified the incorporation of the automation guidelines,
and provided a design that was responsive to the requirements of the commercial
transport mission. In service of this endeavor, problem definition activities were
conducted that identified terminal area navigation and guidance as the foc-_s for
the ensuing conceptual design activity. The effort began with detailed
requirements definition and operational familiarization exercises of direct
relevance to the terminal area navigation problem. Both airborne and ground-
based (ATC) elements of aircraft control were extensively researched. The
products of these activities constituted the starting points for the design effort, in
which the TANDAM system concept was specified, and the crew interface and
associated systems were described. Additionally, three detailed descent and
approach scenarios were devised in order to illustrate the principal functions of
the TANDAM system concept in relation to the crew, the aircraft, and ATC. A
proposed test plan for the evaluation of the TANDAM system was established.
The guidelines were developed and refined based on reviews of relevant
literature, and on experience gained in the design effort.
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
The development of modern transport aircraft continues to introduce new,
powerful technologies to the domain of the National Airspace System.
Advances in data input, analysis, and transfer, coupled with developments
in information display, control, and management have provided the air
transport crew with the potential for unprecedented operational
capabilities. Current automated systems for information management,
(i.e., systems that organize, filter, and provide other systems and the crew
with vital information) have made possible dramatic improvements in ride
quality, fuel burn, navigation, systems monitoring and diagnosis, and
communications. Automation has also played heavily in the recent
incorporation of time-critical safety systems such as the Traffic alert and
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) and reactive windshear technologies.
In the near future, these advances in airborne automation will be
accompanied by major changes in equipment and procedures for ground-
based air traffic management. Next generation Air Traffic Control (ATC)
will rely heavily on automation for assistance in aircraft spacing, flow
rates, collision avoidance, complex approaches, handoffs, and air-ground
communications--all designed to increase capacity and efficiency while
maintaining or even increasing levels of air travel safety.
These increased capabilities arrive at a time when they are sorely needed;
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by some accounts, air transport passenger growth will more than double in
the next two decades, and instrument controlled operations will be more
than half again as frequent in terminal areas as they are at present
(reviewed in ref. 1). However, according to researchers such as Wiener
(ref. 2), the full benefits of these capabilities have yet to be realized.
Sarter and Woods (ref. 3), for example, reported that pilots view certain
Flight Management System functions as providing advanced capabilities at
the price of increased crew workload, difficulty in anticipating all of the
automation's actions, and the possible degradation in the crew's awareness
of the aircraft's overall status and flight situation.
These concerns arising from operational experience with the current
generation of automation have prompted NASA and industry to re-evaluate
the implementations of these advanced capabilities. Billings (ref. 4), in his
review of cockpit automation,states the issue succinctly:
It should be noted immediately that it is not clear whether this [issue
regarding the capabilities of some current automation] is an inherent
automation problem, or whether this is because we have not provided simple
enough interfaces through which pilots interact with automation. (p. 17)
One often mentioned concern about current automation is that designers
have not gone far enough in accommodating and capitalizing on human
cognitive and perceptual abilities. For example, in a comparison of
operations in more and less automated cockpits, Wiener and his colleagues
(ref. 5) observed that ostensively similar navigation tasks -- either
performed manually (in one aircraft) or by means of automation (in
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another) -- demonstrated differences in crew procedures that did not take
full advantage of the crew's ability to effectively manage workload.
In an effort to galvanize the research and development community around
such concerns, NASA has developed a major research thrust that expressly
calls for the development of automated systems designed to fully capitalize
on the capabilities of the human operator while still providing to that
operator the rather substantial benefits realizable with automation. This
philosophy of "human-centered" automation was identified as critical to the
success of the next generation of automated systems in NASA's "Aviation
Safety/Automation Program" (ref. 6). Wiener and Curry (ref. 7) and
Billings (ref. 4) have articulated the major tenets of this philosophy in the
form of design guidelines and recommendations.
Flight deck automation design can clearly profit from adherence to all
aspects of human-centered design, but several general issues are of
particular importance:
Ensuring that the crew can readily understand, anticipate, and influence
the actions of the automation;
Ensuring that use of the automation does not detract from, but rather
enhances the crew's continual situation awareness;
Ensuring that the automation optimizes crew workload, and that it operates
in an error-resistant and error-tolerant fashion, without contributing to
such dangerous conditions as complacency or unnoticed failures;
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Ensuring that the automation interface facilitates crew involvement and
awareness, and maintains crew prerogative by recognizing and
supplementing the crew's understanding of mission objectives, current
flight status, and probable future situational variables.
A human-centered approach to automation presupposes that the human
operator possessesmany of the critical skills and knowledge required for
safe, efficient flight; this approach therefore endorses the employment of
human capabilities as vital to successful design. Researchers and the pilot
community both point to such human assetsas the ability to learn from
experience, to make quick, decisive judgements in uncertain, time-critical
situations, and to cope with unanticipated, perplexing problems--even when
these problems have, perhaps, never been encountered before, or when
they may suggest no one "correct" solution. It is perhaps no surprise,
therefore, that the most sophisticated efforts in developing artificial
intelligence and other "smart" automated systems focus on these same
problem-solving and decision-making abilities. Thus, it is essential that
advanced automated systems assist the transport crew in these high-level
tasks, if these systems are to be considered genuinely human-centered. But
to be able to perform such functions, automated systems must be able to
monitor and assessseveral classes of mission-relevant variables: The
rapidly changing situation of the aircraft at any given point in its route, the
more strategic elements of the mission plan (and modifications by ATC and
other external conditions), the crew's cognitive and physical states, and
their anticipated needs and preferences. In these important respects,
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human-centered automation must be adaptive to the flight situation, and
responsive to crew and mission demands.
PROBLEM
Information flow in the modem transport cockpit continues to increase in
quantity and variety; the need to effectively manage and use this
information is rapidly outstripping the limited processing capabilities of the
human crew in many operational arenas (ref. 2; ref. 3). This explosion of
information (and its consequent critical need for effective control) can be
seen in virtually all flight-critical functions:
- Communication functions--these can range from Data Link functions to
voice communications activities.
- Flight and navigation functions--this area encompasses several classes of
activities: those currently covered by the Flight Guidance System and
the Flight Management System; those related to aspects of flight control
optimization; and those involved with such time-critical event systems as
the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS), the Traffic alert and
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), and windshear alerts.
- Aircraft systems functions--these concern functions involved with
electrical, hydraulic, fuel, and propulsion systems. Future applications
include sophisticated component failure diagnostic capabilities associated
with a broad range of onboard systems.
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It is evident, then, that effective human interface systems, automation
responsive to mission requirements, and other aspects of human-centered
design will have to keep pace with the rapid development of flight deck
automation if successful implementation is to result. And while pilots'
opinions of current-day automation are clearly positive, their concerns
with some aspects of current implementation readily highlight areas for
improvement. For example, studies by Wiener (ref. 2) and Billings (ref.
4) have reported that crews characterize some instances of automation as:
- Sometimes confusing or opaque in their operation, and in the
consequences of their actions;
- Workload-intensive during already high-workload periods and
workload-alleviating during already low-workload periods;
- Insidious with respect to error creation and propagation, and inadequate
with respect to error detection and rectification;
- Unresponsive or cumbersome with regard to on-line modifications
necessitated by unplanned changes or unanticipated events; and
- Poorly integrated with related onboard and/or ground-based systems.
Researchers have characterized the crew's changing role in the modem,
highly automated cockpit as moving from continuous hands-on control of
the aircraft to managing its many sophisticated systems. While this is
certainly true, the characterization does not sufficiently emphasize the
important point that this new managerial role, if not executed prudently,
carries with it the danger of removing the crew from their primary
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responsibility--safely and efficiently transporting passengers and aircraft
from Point A to Point B. In this important sense, the role of the crew has
not changed and is not likely to change in the near future. The problem,
then, is how to allow the crew to maintain involvement, prerogative, and
awareness of mission functions while fully exploiting the capabilities of
automated assistance to efficiently perform these essential duties.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The principal goal of this research was to develop and demonstrate a
concept for an automated system capable of fully exploiting situation-
specific information in order to tailor and optimize its assistance to the
aircrew. This use of situational cues (e.g., significant flight plan events,
environmental conditions, aircraft state data, crew inputs, and ATC
directives) to constrain and direct the automation's operation is herein
referred to as employing "context-sensitive" automation. Based on analyses
of accident and incident reports and other relevant operational data,
descent- and approach-phase navigation and communication activities were
identified as the functional domains to be incorporated in this conceptual
design. At the onset, it was clear that this research was to embrace two
related themes: A heavy reliance on human-centered design principles and
guidelines, and the aforementioned incorporation of automation concepts
capable of adapting to and utilizing operational, situational, and crew-
initiated inputs. It was anticipated that the concept for the automated
system would, where appropriate, incorporate or accommodate:
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- Mission/functional requirements and safety considerations;
- Situational conditions that could vary due to mission phase, specific
events (planned and unplanned), pilot preference, etc.;
- Mental models, and other cognitive, perceptual, and operational
characteristics of crew members. Included also in this concern were
relevant crew emotional and physiological states.
A supporting goal of this research was the delineation of improved
integration and coordinated operation of the system concept with other
airborne (e.g., Data Link) and ground-based systems. This goal was served
by conducting research concerning the overall integration of the individual
onboard systems at a crew system information management level. Among
other duties, this overall mission/aircraft management function would be
responsible for the timely coordination and high-level processing of all
aircraft systems necessary for continual crew involvement and control.
The second major goal of this program was to develop design guidelines
suitable for assisting designers in their creation of automation. Particular
emphasis was placed on developing guidelines for automation designed to
exploit aspects of specific situational information. Significant efforts were
made to ensure that these guidelines incorporated relevant issues raised in
other existing design guidelines documents.
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APPROACH
OVERVIEW
This research and development program comprised two technical efforts: (1)
The development of a set of guidelines for the design of automated systems,
with particular focus placed on automation that takes advantage of contextual
information; and (2) the conceptual design of an automated system capable of
assisting the crew in terminal area navigation and communication operations.
The design effort would both exemplify the incorporation of the guidelines,
and hopefully offer a point design demonstrating the superior value of an
automated system responsive to the mission-driven requirements of the
commercial transport environment. These two sets of technical activities are
schematicized in Figure 1. As is depicted in the figure, identifying candidates
for automation and conducting preliminary problem definition activities
yielded the (aforementioned) candidate issue for the resulting design effort.
These activities and a literature review also provided inputs to the generation
of the design guidelines. The design effort began with detailed requirements
definition, and operational familiarization activities of direct relevance to the
terminal area navigation and communication problem. The products of these
activities constituted the starting points for the design effort proper, in which
the system concept was specified, and the crew interface and associated
systems were described. A test plan for the evaluation of the system concept
was then established. Guidelines for conducting design efforts with technical
objectives similar to the present endeavor were documented.
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DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT ACTIVITIES
Development of Design Guidelines
Development of the design guidelines began with a review of two sets of
technical literature: A sizable and varied set of papers addressing issues in
automation development, and a small number of papers offering design
guidelines, general suggestions, and organizational schemes relevant to
automation design. From these readings, and from our experiences on the
present design effort, a framework for the current guidelines was established.
Detailed design guidelines (gleaned from this literature review and developed
ill the course of the current design effort) were then generated in response to
this organization. These guidelines were subsequently reviewed and refined
by McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC) crew station design personnel.
Problem Definition for Design of an Automated System
The first component of the design effort was a problem definition activity
involving the analysis of incident and accident data, and the review of
literature germane to operational problems and to automation issues generally.
Incident and accident data were obtained from three sources: A data base
maintained by MDC, anecdotal accounts and pilot interview responses
reported in research papers (e.g., ref. 4), and a contractor-solicited Aviation
Safety Reporting System analysis of FMS operation problems occurring
during descents and approaches (ref. 8). Analysis of these data yielded a
12
fairly clear representation of the problems with current automated systems
(principally the FMS), and a rough indication of what aspectsof the mission
(in terms of crew workload and situation awareness, phase of flight, aircraft
configuration, and external conditions)"invited" their characteristic
occurrence. This analysis also provided indirect guidance for recognizing
potential design shortcomings, and for suggesting ways of preventing their
incorporation into future systems.
The literature review generally supported and amplified the aforementioned
incident/accident findings, and also provided information as to the probable
direction and scope of advanced automation technologies currently under
development for inclusion in the National Airspace System. Airborne
technologies mentioned included sophisticated data base systems, 4-D
navigation capabilities, differential global positioning systems, and Data Link
systems. Ground-based developments ranged from automated maintenance
and diagnosis equipment to the Center/TRACON Automation System (CTAS)
designed to control aircraft spacing in the terminal area. This information
was invaluable since it helped define the sort of general automated
environment that could reasonably be assumed to exist in the time frame when
a system like the one under consideration might become operational.
Moreover, a thorough understanding of these advanced technology concepts
(in particular, CTAS) proved to be a _trong driver in the determination of the
present system concept's functional requirements, and an important constraint
on the responsibilities this system would possess, share, or depend upon from
other sources. Similarly, insights were gained regarding the possible
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allocations of functions between the aircrew and the automation. In large
part, these insights dictated the role of the automated system and the design
philosophy adopted in this concept development effort.
This problem definition activity concluded with the identification of the
general operational domain to be served by the automated system --
navigation, guidance, and supporting communications functions occurring in
descents, approaches, and landings.
Operational Familiarization
Following this problem definition effort, a number of operational
familiarization activities were pursued. Familiarization with relevant airborne
systems and operations covered an extensive range of activities. The MD-1 l's
Computer-Based Training (CBT) program offered operational information
about all major guidance and control systems. CBT sessions on the MD-1 l's
Autoflight system (Autopilot, Autothrottles, etc.), Flight Management System
(FMS), and associated displays and controls provided detailed procedural
knowledge regarding these systems and their functioning. Extensive reviews
of the MD-1 l's various operational manuals complemented the CBT
information. The MD-88's operational manual for its FMS was also studied in
order to compare this earlier generation flight guidance and navigation
automation with the MD-1 l's configuration.
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Accompanying these efforts to become familiar with existing automated
systems were reviews of a number of critical capabilities not yet in service (in
their more fully capable versions). Airborne 4-D navigation (i.e., navigation
including precise schedule constraints along the route) capabilities were
reviewed for their obvious potential utility for advanced navigation
management. Concepts for Data Link systems -- including interface issues
such as display content and format, and air-ground interactive requirements --
were evaluated so as to ascertain the probable operational advantages and
limitations they would present for the automated system under consideration
in this research effort. Familiarization with airborne systems also included a
review of the sophisticated capabilities and operations envisioned for next-
generation commercial transports such as the Enhanced Cockpit (EC) concept
for the MD-90 aircraft.
Substantial familiarization with the relevant ground-based systems was seen as
essential to the ultimate viability of the automated system design concept under
development in the present research effort. To this end, significant effort was
expended studying the procedures of terminal area air traffic controllers and
their associated reasoning and decision making. Familiarization ac,',,itie_
included studying ATC-related research reports, monitoring ATC-a.,,:raft
clearance sequences, observing TRACON controllers, and con _ zi_,!
extensive interviews with a number of these controllers.
In addition to surveying current ATC procedures and functions, a concerted
effort was made to become familiar with relevant aspects of ATC's next
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generation of automation aids and computational capabilities. Chief among
these (at least with respect to the current design effort) is NASA's
Center/TRACON Automation System (CTAS) which will function to assist
controllers in scheduling and metering aircraft as they enter the terminal
control area. The means by which this control of aircraft order and spacing is
accomplished -- complex clearances optimized to reduce overall delays -- had
an important impact on the proposed operation (and capability) of the system
concept developed in the present research effort.
Requirements Definition and Technical Assessment
Consideration of the automation issues identified in the previously discussed
literature review, and familiarization with airborne and ground-based
technologies in the National Airspace System, directed the present research
effort to develop a concept for a crew aiding system -- the Terminal Area
Navigation Decision Aiding Mediator (TANDAM) -- that would assist the
crew in executing next-generation navigation, guidance and communication
functions to be required in Descent and Approach operations. To this end,
functional requirements for the TANDAM system were derived, and these, in
turn, were translated into design requirements. Functional capabilities of the
TANDAM system concept were supported by a thorough incorporation of
human-centered design principles, and by considering the employment of
flight-context triggered cuing mechanisms to enable the automation to be
responsive to situational changes throughout the mission. The TANDAM
system would conduct such navigation and guidance activities as presenting
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ATC clearances to the crew, assisting in the evaluation and possible
negotiation of these clearances, preparing probable alternate routes subsequent
to clearances, readying the flight deck for anticipated changes (e.g., runway
step-over maneuvers), and facilitating the down-linking of context-specific
information (e.g., weather at altitude, estimated waypoint arrival times).
These capabilities were demonstrated in operationally representative Descent
and Approach scenarios. In these scenarios, critical aspects of the TANDAM
system's performance were shown in the temporally sequenced context of
probable future operational procedures involving the crew and ATC
(principally via CTAS), and utilizing an advanced, 4-D capable navigation and
guidance system, and Data Link. The scenarios were designed to be relatively
realistic in terms of hardware and software capabilities, operational
requirements, situational influences, and crew and ATC workload. Three
scenarios were generated: A descent and approach into Los Angeles
International Airport (LAX) under CTAS governance and using Data Link, a
descent and approach into John Wayne Airport (SNA) without the benefit of
CTAS or Data Link, and an approach into LAX (with CTAS and Data Link)
focusing on preparations for a possible change in runway assignments.
Conceptual Design of the TANDAM system
The functional organization, and detailed capabilities of the TANDAM system
were articulated to define the system concept, and to better delineate the
system's role as a navigation and guidance assistant. In support of this goal,
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critical interface elements (e.g., the Flight Mode Control Panel, Navigation
Display formats), procedures regarding 4-D clearance negotiations, and
automation/crew interactions were described. Schematics of some significant
operational capabilities were provided in order to suggest possible directions
for the eventual structure of the TANDAM system's functional architecture.
Lastly, the TANDAM system was portrayed in its functional relationship with
other aircraft systems in order to demonstrate its anticipated integration and
coordination with these systems.
Products
A number of significant design products were developed in the course of this
research project, and are presented in this report. First, in consideration of
certain critical assumptions and philosophy issues, the utility of automation
design guidelines was addressed. These positions made explicit, guidelines for
the design of automated systems were documented, and have been placed in an
appendix to the main body of the report (due to their substantial length). The
report also contains the detailed description of the TANDAM system concept,
and the three descent and approach scenarios instantiating its operation and
functional interaction with the aircraft, crew, and ATC. These capabilities,
initially excerpted from the descent and approach scenarios, were elaborated
upon to further explicate significant aspects of the system's potential
operational utility. A test plan to evaluate a more complete and refined
version of the TANDAM system is also provided. This plan describes the
proposed scope and method of evaluation, as well as the test's general content.
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The test was designed to evaluate several relevant factors: Operational utility;
ease and accuracy of crew usage; depth and accuracy of system functioning;
and potential for enhanced safety and economic advantage.
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RESULTS
ISSUES REGARDING DESIGN PHILOSOPHY AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES
The assumptions and philosophical positions adopted in the development of the
automation guidelines are now discussed in some detail. This underlying
philosophy was articulated so as to make explicit the design principles embodied
in the guidelines, and to thereby explain the reasons for choices made in their
construction. These assumptions address several areas of design: Software and
hardware capabilities; automation control, operating logics, and computational
techniques; and the role of the automation and the operator in the control of the
mission function(s) being supported. In (at least) these important respects, the
assumptions designers make can clearly have significant and often critical
influence over the capabilities and appropriateness of the automated systems
developed for future commercial flight decks. The guidelines themselves are
presented in the appendix to this document.
Introductory Comments
Recommendations and guidelines for the effective design of automated systems
share a number of important characteristics with other design guidelines. For
example, since the human operator often interacts with the automated system,
guidelines regarding the design of an interface are typically relevant. And, since
the automated systems are specialized software and/or hardware systems residing
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in the overall avionics system, guidelines for the design of such technologies are,
of course, pertinent. What makes automation design unique, however, is the need
to establish guidelines advising designers about translating operational and
functional requirements into routines for gathering and interpreting data,
applying rules, etc., and subsequently executing advisories and/or commands to
the aircraft and crew. In this sense,design guidelines for automation must
consider both the system's states and the crew's strategic awareness and
understanding of those states.
Thus, the desire to provide specific, concrete guidelines is often, of necessity,
replaced with the goal of developing guidelines that keep the designer responsive
to the general intent of the design requirement. For example, how a particular
system is programmed may be irrelevant from a design point of view; however,
how it acts as a result of that programming (i.e., how it obtains information,
processes it, makes interpretations, and informs its users) is of central concern to
the designer.
It is essential to keep in mind that the designer of an automated system is (or at
least should be) driven by one overriding concern: The satisfaction of mission
and functional requirements. Moreover, the means by which this automated
system satisfies these requirements must follow two interrelated tenets: The
designed system must be able to effectively accomplish (or support) the execution
of its identified technical tasks (e.g., ensuring that 4-D calculations to a fix are
accurate and timely), and it must be able to accomplish these tasks in ways that
involve, inform, and assist the crew without also resulting in undue levels of
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workload, and while still ensuring an optimal level of situational awareness.
Moreover, this second tenet, often referred to as human-centered design,
demands that this inclusion of the human operator go well beyond mere
accommodation of his or her presence. Human-centered design endeavors to
develop technologies that take advantage of human cognitive and perceptual
strengths and preferences, and that help compensate for human limitations. These
guidelines for the design of automated systems must, therefore, direct the
designer of advanced commercial flight decks to remain cognizant of human
skills and their possible utility in satisfying the mission and functional
requirements.
Assumptions and Design Philosophy
In any design effort, assumptions must be made regarding mission requirements,
relative level of functional advancement over current flight deck capabilities,
software and hardware capabilities, and extent of the system's impact on the
integrity of other cockpit systems, and on the crew's procedures. These
assumptions in large part govem the designer's thinking in the design process,
and greatly constrain the design philosophy adopted -- the designer does well to
make explicit the assumptions of the design goal and the consequent design
philosophy being followed. Determination of these assumptions could come from
any number of pragmatic, technical, or theoretical considerations. In human-
centered design, assumptions must be the products of mission requirements,
human information processing capabilities, and constraints emergent from other
relevant systems, procedures, and the like.
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In any effort to design an automated system for an advanced flight deck, several
assumptions must be made if a coherent, principled design is to be developed.
Chief among these are assumptions regarding the following general design
parameters.
Software and hardware system capabilities. In the case of the present
design effort, several current avionics technologies (e.g., the Flight Guidance
System) will be assumed to exist in advanced forms. Some of the required
technologies would possess substantially enhanced capabilities (e.g., the FMS will
need to be able to rapidly load and customize altemate flight plans, approach
plates, etc.), and certain of the technologies not yet in service (e.g., onboard 4-D
navigation, CTAS) would be posited to be operational in the time frame
envisioned for the automated system's incorporation into the commercial
transport fleet.
The types of systems controls, operating logics, and associated
computational schemes. In the case of the present effort, the design
philosophy chosen was to be as conservative as possible (i.e., deterministic, rule-
based) in the programming techniques that would be called for to support the
automated system concept. In the case of this design effort, this decision was
motivated by the kinds of operational capabilities revealed in the analysis of
mission requirements and further articulated in the development of the scenarios
(e.g., facilitating the negotiation of a 4-D descent clearance). In the problems
identified for terminal area navigation operations, standard computational
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techniques (that were fast and able to deal with large bodies of data) would
probably be able to accomplish the large majority of mission functions called out
in the scenarios. In the design of automated systems for more advanced flight
deck applications, programming approaches such as neural network technologies
or various non-deterministic (probabilistic) computational techniques might be
required.
Determination of the extent of automaticity versus extent of human
involvement. One decision crucial to the choice of design philosophy is
determining the degree to which the automation will function autonomously,
versus the degree to which dependence on human monitoring and intervention
will be required. This issue of extent of automaticity is critical since the
consequences of a poorly thought out philosophy in this regard can result, at one
extreme, in ineffectual (minimal) automation and, at the other, in completely
opaque and surprising (maximal) automated control. Unfortunately, this decision
is too often made on the basis of any number of peripheral criteria -- technical
feasibility, for example, or even simple expedience. From a human-centered
design perspective, only the potential for reduced workload, the expectation of
maintained or increased situational awareness, and the ability to capitalize on
mission-enhancing options should be determinants of the applicability and extent
of automaticity.
However, determining the appropriate extent of automated functioning is
potentially complicated by other tenets of human-centered design. Consider, for
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example, two of Charles Billings' (ref. 4) general principles for hunlan-centered
automation:
"To command effectively, the human operator must be involved. (p. 13)"
"To be involved, the human operator must be informed. (p. 13)"
Taking these principles at face value, one could reason that the more involved
(and, by implication, informed) the human operator, the more in command that
operator would be. But, since one of the typical motivations for deciding to
automate is to u._Qnburden the operator from having to be cognizant of all aspects
of a function, -- that is, purposefully rendering the operator less informed about
every detail of the function's execution -- automating could easily be seen as
lessening informativeness and involvement, and therefore being opposed to
Billings' design principles.
The resolution to this apparent dilemma, of course, lies in what the human
operator is informed about. Billings is certainly not recommending that an
automated system should tell the operator about every detail of that system's
processing. Rather, he is recommending that the automated system (and any
context-sensitive mechanisms used to support it) be crafted such that precisely and
only the relevant calculations, events, states, etc., be interpreted for, and reported
to, the crew.
To re-couch the issue then, it is perhaps more accurate to say that the appropriate
degree of automaticity is determined by the designer's success in first identifying
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the essential operational information required by the operator (for situation
awareness), and then effectively presenting that information to the operator in the
course of the system's execution of the automated function. In this regard, then,
the designer cannot be free to make the arbitrary decision to specify more or less
automated functioning -- done correctly, such decisions can only result from an
understanding of human information processing requirements, and the mission's
purpose.
In summary, it is evident that the determination of automation requirements
should be based on a thorough understanding of mission requirements,
operational constraints, and human capabilities and limitations. This
understanding is essential since it is on its basis that the designer must determine
what functions and activities, in what contexts, should be accomplished or assisted
by an automated system. This understanding must be both comprehensive (in
terms of mission goals) and procedural (in terms of specific crew and system
decisions and activities) so as to provide the designer with both strategic and
tactical goals for the system design. The understanding of the mission objectives
and operational context -- whether learned from flight phase, environmental
factors, or pilot state -- provide the cuing mechanisms for enlisting the assistance
of the automated system, and for determining what data must be evaluated and
what decisions and actions must be considered.
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PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND OPERATIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS
Determination of the operational problem being addressed in the current design
effort was based on an evaluation of automation use in current "glass cockpit"
aircraft. This evaluation first considered summary statistic and anecdotal reports
of incidents and accidents relevant to cockpit automation. Also reviewed were
compilations of pilot-solicited comments regarding the operation and
understanding of automated systems. Additionally, this evaluation studied
experimental investigations demonstrating characteristic procedural errors, non-
optimal uses of the airborne systems, and problems with mode awareness and
consequences related to flight deck automation.
From this evaluation, evidence converged on a number of interrelated factors that
have all contributed to the identification of the functional problems addressed in
the present TANDAM system design concept. A summary of this evidence, and
an explanation of its consequence for this research effort, are now provided.
Characterizing Problems with Cockpit Automation
As was indicated above, reports of incidents and accidents were evaluated for
their relevance to the identification of possible problems with current automation.
Two types of reports were available for analysis: Incidents and accidents
obligatorily reported to the FAA (and subsequently recorded in aircraft safety
data bases), and pilot accounts elicited in various interview settings.
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The present study's analysis of incident and accident data was accomplished in
two phases. First, an inspection of Douglas Aircraft Company's "Commercial Jet
Transport Safety Statistics; 1991" (ref. 9) document was performed in order to
establish general statistical trends regarding aircraft safety mishaps, etc. This
review of aircraft safety data revealed a number of relevant statistical patterns.
For example, of the approximately 1285 serious accidents (with aircraft damage
sustained) observed between 1958 and 1991, 736 (57%) occurred during
approach and landing, even though only about 15% of an average flight's time is
spent in these phases. The flight phase containing the next most frequent accident
occurrence, takeoff (typically comprising about 1% of total flight time)
accounted for some 18% (237) of the total events, and exhibited over twice the
accident frequency observed for any of the remaining flight phases. For the
purposes of the current design effort, it is significant to note that aircraft safety
data also showed that the majority of accidents that related to problems with
control activities involved crew-induced mishaps. Moreover, of accidents clearly
involving crew behaviors, the captain's actions have been at least partially
responsible in 657 (80%) of the 817 recorded cases. Of these captain-involved
accidents, less than adequate executive (i.e., command) actions (40%) and
judgements (21%), and failure to follow proper procedures (11%) were cited in
the clear majority of cases. Other reasons implicated in captain-involved
accidents included less than adequate awareness (6%), failure to monitor
instruments (5%), less than adequate preparations (4%), failure to take immediate
action (3%), and failure to use proper safety procedures (3%).
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After this general pass through reported safety data, a search of McDonnell
Douglas Aerospace's aircraft safety data base was conducted using a small
number of selection criteria: Events were selected that were reported between
1983 and 1992 inclusive, that had occurred in any phase of flight, and that had
appeared to have involved (or at least implicated) some onboard automated
system. This search yielded 64 events. Subsequent inspection of these events
yielded 32 that were reliably classifiable in terms of phase of flight, and probable
type of automated flight function involved and phase of flight. As can be seen in
Figure 2, the overwhelming majority of these events occurred in the Approach
and Landing phases and involved navigation and guidance functions. Of this
group, the most frequent problems concerned various nonprecision approaches
and non-optimal environmental conditions, and thus tended to involve the
operation of autoflight systems, and navaid and tracking systems employed in
final approach segments.
A selected compilation of aircraft events recounted by Billings (ref. 4), identifies
several critical examples of automation-related problems. Classification of these
events, in terms of phase of flight and type of function, is shown in Figure 2. In
Billings' sample (not intended to be statistically representative), automation
problems are noted in every phase of flight, and are most prevalent in Systems
functions during Takeoff (as shown in Figure 2).
Accounts of automation difficulties elicited from pilots are available in a number
of studies (e.g., ref.10). Some studies by Wiener and his colleagues (ref. 2; ref.
5) are among the best of these accounts and are therefore used in this evaluation.
29
FUNCTION
FLIGHT 1
GUIDANCE/
NAVIGATION 2
3
4
COMMUNI- 1
CATIONS
2
3
4
SYSTEMS 1
2
3
4
TAKEOFF
PHASE OF FLIGHT
CLIMB CRUISE i DESCENT APPROACH &
LANDING
IIIIIIIlUll
IIIlUlIIIII III
lU II
I '1111111111 IIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIII
IIII
I
III
II
IIII
IIIlUll | I I III
III II IIII I IIII
IIIIIIII
U
KEY
1. McDonnell-Douglas Aerospace
2. Billings, 1991 (ref.4)
3. Wiener, 1989 (ref. 2)
4. Wiener, et al., 1991 (ref. 5)
FIGURE 2. SUMMARY OF REPORTS OF PILOT ERRORS, INCIDENTS, AND
ACCIDENTS AS A FUNCTION OF PHASE OF FLIGHT AND FUNCTIONAL DOMAIN
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In these investigations, line pilots described experiences in which they
encountered difficulties or made mistakes in their operations of automated
systems such as the FMS and the Autoflight System. These elicited comments,
again sorted in terms of flight phase and type of function, are presented in Figure
2. This classification of reports indicates that pilots were most aware of
navigation and guidance difficulties, followed by problems related to aircraft
systems operations. And, as would be assumed, navigation and guidance
problems were most prevalent subsequent to takeoff activities.
To summarize thus far, a few significant patterns clearly recur in the foregoing
studies and analyses. Firstly, while problems with present-day automation are
possible in every phase of flight, their prevalence in later phases, and, in
particular, Descent, Approach, and Landing, constitutes a significant portion (if
not the majority) of all automation-related accidents, incidents, and operational
difficulties. Secondly, the largest segment of these automation problems directly
impacts navigation and guidance functions, and therefore tends to involve use of
the FMS, the Autoflight System, and navaid tracking systems. And, while these
analyses of the available data are admittedly imprecise and incomplete, they do
unambiguously indict significant aspects of current automation, and strongly
demonstrate the need for improved capability in future navigation and guidance
automation.
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Some Analyses of FMS-Related Difficulties
This discussion of automation-related problems has now been narrowed to
concentrate on difficulties with the management of navigation and guidance
occurring during descents, approaches, and landings. To more precisely identify
these FMS-involved difficulties, two (of the many available) representative
studies are now considered.
A survey of line pilots
With an expressly exclusive focus on navigation functions, Sarter and Woods
(ref. 3) surveyed 135 Boeing 737-300 pilots about their experiences operating
that aircraft's FMS. In their analysis, these researchers identified several specific
FMS-related "surprises" -- unforeseen or seemingly inexplicable behaviors of the
FMS -- that were potentially problematic for effective planning and execution of
navigation activities. These "surprises," along with the frequencies with which
they were volunteered (pp. 15-19), are summarized here:
- Problems related to the use of the FMS's Vertical Navigation Modes were
common:
- Pilots reported difficulties in understanding the logic of calculations
related to vertical maneuvers, and were therefore often unable to
accurately predict how and when such maneuvers would be initiated,
maintained (or modified), and concluded. (38 reports)
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Pilots reported difficulties in understanding the consequences (for the
FMS plan) of interrupting an FMS-initiated vertical maneuver with a
change executed on the Flight Mode Control Panel. (11 reports)
Pilots reported a general lack of understanding for how the FMS's
Vertical Navigation Speed Descent mode operates, including how targets,
restrictions, and general maneuver calculation logics work. (8 reports)
- Pilots reported substantial difficulties disengaging the Approach mode
when required. (6 reports)
- Problems involving data entry were frequently cited, including problems
arising from inadequate feedback after erroneous entries. (54 reports)
Pilots indicated problems understanding and predicting FMS-initiated (so
called "uncommanded") changes between flight modes. The most common
situation mentioned was the FMS's reversion from Vertical Speed mode to
Level Change mode when airspeed deviated from a critical range. (28
reports)
- Not surprisingly, pilots volunteered that they lacked adequate understanding
of infrequently used FMS features. (14 reports)
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Some pilots commented that pitch commands indicated with the PFD's flight
director did not always appear appropriate to the maneuver being executed,
and therefore lessened their confidence in the FMS logic. (11 reports)
Some pilots reported being confused about what the currently active target
values are, owing largely to a lack of understanding of how the Autoflight
System and the FMS were coordinating in a given flight regime (i.e., were
the FMCP or the FMS settings active). (10 reports)
Several pilots expressed frustration with the relatively large -- and in their
opinions, excessive -- number of ways to achieve various navigation and
guidance functions. (10 reports)
Several pilots expressed frustration and concern about having to repeatedly
enter the same data into different FMS pages. These pilots would have
preferred that such data entry was done only once, and was then
automatically copied to other relevant pages. (9 reports)
A few pilots admitted that they lacked a clear understanding of which
subsystems of the FMS would remain operational in the event of failures of
other components of the FMS. (3 reports)
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Aviation Safety Reporting System findings
In an effort to obtain a sample that was more representative of all FMSs currently
in service, a NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System search was solicited on
FMS-related incidents. The documentation of this search, "Last Minute FMS
Reprogramming Changes" (ref. 8), presented pilot reports of FMS-involved
incidents occurring in Climb, Cruise, Descent, and Approach phases (since the
previously reported statistical data indicated that these flight phases yielded the
majority of potentially significant problems with FMS functioning). The search
of 38051 reports filed since the beginning of 1986 yielded 76 incidents, of which
53 clearly implicated nominal operation of the FMS and/or the Flight Guidance
System (FGS). Except for 2 incidents reported in Climb (1 FGS error, and 1
FMS error), all occurred in Descent (39 FMS-, and 5 FGS- involved) and
Approach (6 FMS-, and 1 FGS-involved). Figure 3 presents a summary of the
reports for Descent and Approach phases.
Of the FMS-involved incidents reported in Descent, the most numerous, 28, were
caused by programming errors that lead to failures to attain assigned altitudes. In
21 of these incidents, the aircraft's altitude was above the ATC directive, and in
the remaining 7, it was below the assigned altitude. As is evident in Figure 3, the
high altitude violations were fairly evenly split between incidents due to late
initiations of FMS programming (10), and those in which the root causes were
not adequately specified (11), suggesting that the late initiation count may well be
underestimated in these reports. The 5 FGS-related incidents observed in
Descents involved errors or misinterpretations of guidance parameter settings and
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selections. Two of these were reported to have resulted in altitude busts; one in
which the executed altitude was above the ATC assignment, and one in which it
was below.
Incidents reported for Approach were substantially fewer in frequency: 6
involved FMS usage, and 1 involved the FGS. All of the FMS-related events
involved programming errors, with 2 resulting from slow or late initiation of the
programming sequence, and 4 resulting from input errors. In the single FGS-
related Approach incident, the aircraft failed to descend when required by ATC.
It is significant to report that confusions about the functional integration of the
FMS and FGS were directly implicated in a small number of the aforementioned
incidents (5), and appeared to be involved in several others as well. Pilots
reported confusions about FMS or FGS control of flight modes and parameter
settings, and about determining the "best" way to execute maneuvers required by
ATC clearances. Similarly, 5 cases were reported in which pilots caused
procedural errors, reportedly because focus on the FMS distracted them from
adequately attending to immediate flight control and monitoring activities.
Operating in the Future National Airspace
The next generation of automation-assisted aircraft will operate in a National
Airspace traffic control system that will itself be highly automated, and will
provide greatly increased aircraft through-put and scheduling flexibility.
Because of this, the determination of requirements for the automated system
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under study in this research effort must be accomplished with due consideration
given to this anticipated ATC environment. To this end, a brief description is
now given of the ground-based ATC system that is assumed to be in place when
the TANDAM system would be implemented in commercial transports.
Specifically, air traffic control in the near future will be substantially aided by a
highly integrated network of automated systems designed to help manage the
control of arrival traffic. This network, the Center/TRACON Automation
System (CTAS), will plan aircraft arrival schedules, and will determine optimal
aircraft speeds, descents, and routes for the controller to use in managing precise
sequencing and spacing functions (ref. 11; ref. 12). CTAS renders this assistance
to the controller in the form of clearance advisories and graphically portrayed
situational information. CTAS performs these functions by means of three
interdependent modules: The Traffic Management Advisor (TMA), the Descent
Advisor (DA), and the Final Approach Spacing Tool (FAST).
Landing times (optimized to accommodate incoming aircraft) are calculated by
the TMA in order to develop a continually updated landing schedule that
minimizes delays for the great majority of incoming traffic. The TMA also
ensures that the scheduling scheme that is generated minimizes the possibility of
traffic conflicts by optimizing inter-aircraft spacing.
The DA enables controllers to effectively command the maneuvers necessary to
follow the TMA's schedule by providing air speed and vertical speed profiles,
and descent and turn advisories, all adhering to 4-D navigational constraints.
Aircraft spacing is maintained first by speed-related commands, and when
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necessary, by route-change commands as well. Additionally, the DA identifies
down-route traffic conflicts, thereby enabling CTAS to issue resolution advisories
well beyond the range of individual aircraft TCAS units.
FAST, operating in the later stages of aircraft approaches, performs scheduling
optimization and 4-D maneuver calculations essentially similar to those used in
the TMA and DA, except that they are customized for fine-tuned control during
final approach. FAST is also capable of assisting controllers with pop-ups and
aircraft re-entering the pattern after a missed approach.
With the assumption that clearances for descents and approaches will be largely
governed by CTAS, an airbome navigation and guidance system appears to
require substantial assistance from an onboard system designed to take advantage
of situational variables and to work in accord with CTAS. This anticipated
requirement is underscored by recent research by Williams and Green (ref. 13)
in which effective compliance with CTAS-class 4-D clearances was demonstrated
when a 4-D capable FMS and Data Link system were used. And Waller's Data
Link simulation work exploring clearance receipt and execution (ref. 14) clearly
suggested significant improvements in time to compliance when the Data Link
system was capable of routing (accepted) clearance parameters to relevant
navigation and guidance systems. The development of a concept (i.e., TANDAM)
for such a system is therefore the objective of the present research effort. The
description of this system concept -- along with a number of flight scenarios
employed to depict its major functional roles -- is presented in the following
sections of this report.
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DESIGN CONCEPT FOR THE TANDAM SYSTEM
The system concept developed in this research effort was designed to provide
context-sensitive decision aiding (and other assistance) for crew activities in
Descent and Approach flight phases. More specifically, the TANDAM system
was designed to assist in 4-D navigation and guidance functions, and in the
clearance negotiations often integral to these functions. The TANDAM system's
functional organization, and its varied capabilities are now described.
Description of the TANDAM System and Related Components
To effectively execute its functions, the TANDAM system will rely heavily on the
capabilities of a number of airborne and ground-based systems. Figure 4
presents a schematic of these systems and their relationships with the TANDAM
system and the aircraft. As can be seen in the figure, the TANDAM system
interacts with airborne sensors, digital (and, to some extent, voice)
communications systems, and an advanced flight management system. Crew
interaction with the automation occurs on an advanced suite of controls and
displays, specialized to accommodate the TANDAM system's functions. (The
TANDAM system's operation is depicted in detail in three flight scenarios
presented later in this report.)
Sensors and other onboard systems provide the FMS and the TANDAM system
with continuously updated data on environmental conditions, aircraft
performance, and configuration characteristics. They are also responsible for
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providing aircraft position, altitude, and attitude information. As Figure 4
indicates, the onboard systems may include advanced versions of air data systems,
INS/IRS and differential GPS, Navaid receivers (for VORs, DMEs, ILS, etc.),
weather radar, and TCAS.
The communication systems, relying principally on an advanced Data Link
system (e.g., satcom), send information to the FMS, and directly to the
TANDAM system and the crew. These systems of course also downlink data to
ATC and to the company. The most important (and typically the most
demanding) information handled by these systems concerns complex 4-D
clearances and their negotiations. Because of the interaction-intensive nature of
these negotiations, no appreciable delays in transmission times will be tolerated
(thus, for example, Mode S will not be adequate for these negotiations).
The FMS and its associated data base conduct all navigation and guidance
calculations, including 4-D estimations. Within the 4-D navigation capability, the
FMS contains a module specialized for the calculation of vertical maneuvers.
This 4-D navigation capability is able to continually re-calculate 4-D waypoint
ETAs, deviations from on-time positions, and compensatory control inputs for
maintaining or regaining these on-time positions. With the assistance of the
TANDAM system, the FMS is able to continually modify its flight plan in
reaction to onboard system, ATC, and other situational inputs. Computational
speed, data base access, and storage (buffering) of data and of alternate
calculations (of maneuvers, speeds, or whole route segments) will far exceed
current FMS capabilities in terms of both capacity and sophistication. The flight
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plan data base (including information on all relevant airways, departures, and
approaches) will need to store detailed flight segment information such as altitude
and other airspace restrictions, and uplinked information regarding current
environmental and traffic conditions. Associated with significant mission events
(e.g., obtaining ATIS information, or initiating a descent) will be data base
elements that cue the TANDAM system to prepare various procedures designed
to facilitate performance in these events (see the mission scenarios for examples).
Also included in the data base will be tags for mission events typified as being
high in workload and/or low in situation awareness. Again, these events will
signal the TANDAM system to prepare assistance routines for use by the crew.
In addition to facilitating clearance negotiations, these assistance procedures will
include offering to take over selected crew tasks, apprising the crew about
upcoming events, making recommendations or suggestions regarding these events
(including recommending task rescheduling for workload management),
informing the crew about significant consequences of current or proposed
actions, and executing crew-selected commands.
The TANDAM system will interact directly with the crew by means of a
functionally integrated system of annunciators, displays, and controls. In this
regard, the initial design position, therefore, was to use a modem "glass" cockpit
configuration (an MD-11-class crew station) as the baseline, adding capabilities as
design requirements dictated. As is evident from the preceding discussion,
several necessary advanced capabilities have indeed been identified and all, to
differing degrees, have had consequences for the crew interface. Those that have
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constituted significant deviations from the MD-1 l's controls and displays are
presented in Figure 5 and will now be described.
The Flight Mode Control Panel (FMCP) will generally resemble existing
advanced FMCPs in both appearance and function (see Figure 6). However, one
significant addition to this panel will be an "Arrival Time" control that is
designed to permit the input of fix arrival-time commands (in a manner
analogous to heading and speed control arrangements). As such, the Arrival
Time control will allow "time-at-fix" assignment, and will operate in pre-select
and select modes. Time will be able to be set in either of two ways, in minutes
and seconds from the present time, or in standard time coordinates. Additionally,
the setting of a time will affect the planned flight path shown on the navigation
display. The display will show the 4-D fix information, or will indicate that the
time-at-fix could not be made. In the latter case, the display will indicate how
late the aircraft would be, or where the aircraft would be at the proposed time
setting. As with other FMCP entries, the consequent effects on speed and vertical
rate will be displayed. A second element of the FMCP will be the incorporation
of a pre-select feature for the vertical speed control. This feature was added to
the FMCP to improve the crew's ability to prepare, inspect, and precisely execute
4-D maneuvers.
The last significant interface feature incorporated in the FMCP -- the highly
integrated functional relationship between the FMCP and the FMS -- ensures that
inputs to the FMCP will not inevitably cause problematic disengagements or
discontinuities in the overall FMS governance of the flight plan. This advanced
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FIGURE 5. MAIN INSTRUMENT PANELS FOR BASELINE
COCKPIT, EMPHASIZING CONTROL AND DISPLAY
SYSTEMS INTERFACING WITH THE TANDAM SYSTEM
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CONTROL PANEL
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FMCP-FMS concept will be able to logically edit and modify an existing flight
plan by simply entering new inputs in the FMCP (as well as in the FMS of
course). In addition, the FMS MCDU's scratch pad can be used during FMCP
editing to enter waypoints, etc., that are not in the current flight plan (and thus
not accessible via the FMCP's scroll key). And a cursor pad device located on the
FMCP can be used (in either FMCP or FMS modes) to quickly designate or
create waypoints, etc., on the NAV display, and in the flight plan. FMS routines
will be able to re-optimize the flight plan for the newly added modifications,
especially with regard to the rather precise tolerances required of the 4-D flight
path management posited for the TANDAM system's cockpit.
The crew will be able to conduct flight path planning and editing on of the FMS
using control features analogous to those outlined for the FMCP. The FMS will
possess a real-time 4-D navigation capability that is fully editable, produces "hot"
updates to all calculations, and can calculate running solutions (i.e., solutions that
are automatically updated as input parameters change) to upcoming 4-D
maneuvers. Moreover, all such calculations will be able to compensate for
situation-specific variations (e.g., wind speed, direction shifts). And, information
regarding such compensatory strategies will be readily accessible to the crew.
Additionally, all course and time deviations resulting in scheduling violations
(i.e., not able to be compensated for by the 4-D FMS) will be clearly indicated to
the crew, along with any suggested replans, etc., to be considered. A vertical
flight path optimization capability (also resident in the advanced FMS) will
generate profile data that can be readied for display and accessed by the crew.
Access will be either at crew discretion, or in response to suggestions based on
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the TANDAM system's prediction of significant consequences of the upcoming
vertical maneuver (e.g., underflying a crossing altitude).
Again because of the design philosophy followed, the working decision has been
to have the FMS share its display/control head with the Data Link system, thereby
obviating the need to identify another acceptable location for an MCDU on the
flight deck. This co-location of FMS and Data Link was also adopted because of
the interaction-intensive sequences that would necessarily obtain between the two
systems during clearance negotiations. Also, using the common MCDU, uplinked
clearances in formats quite similar to their eventual representations on FMS pages
will be easily and accurately inspected by the crew. With the development of an
effective message prioritorization and annunciation scheme, this display/control
co-location will constitute the core of an efficient and reliable functionally
integrated system.
The FMS's MCDU, as shown in Figure 7, will generally resemble other advanced
MCDU designs except for space allotted for the co-location of the dedicated Data
Link controls. Additionally, specialized formats, modes, line-select settings, etc.,
will be required to support advanced functions such as 4-D clearance
negotiations, and other FMS- and Data Link-related interactions with the
TANDAM system. Similar accommodations will be required for non-clearance
and other non-flight-critical communications, and for company business.
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4-D clearance and associated guidance information will be presented on the
Primary Flight and Navigation displays (PFD and ND). In addition to standard
tactical flight parameters and direction, the PFD (see Figure 8) will also display
4-D navigation mode selection, "bugs" associated with speed, heading, altitude,
and vertical speed settings (determined by the pre-selected or currently
operational 4-D maneuvers), and time-to-maneuver information when relevant.
The ND will present its information on two general formats: A modified map
mode that presents 4-D information, and various maneuver guidance and
configuration change prompts (see Figure 9); and a vertical profile planning
schematic (see Figure 10) used to assist the crew in their selection of guidance by
showing vertical maneuver options, constraints, etc., and their associated fuel use
and passenger comfort estimates
Capabilities of the TANDAM System
As conceptualized in this design effort, the TANDAM system will (in conjunction
with other systems) perform sophisticated flight management functions, and will,
in reaction to situational changes and general operational goals, customize its
assistance to the crew, to other onboard systems, and to ATC.
The TANDAM system will act to coordinate data base updates, prepare for
anticipated events in the flight plan, and manage air-ground communications.
Additionally, it will help coordinate, negotiate, and comply with the directives of
ATC (principally generated by CTAS) while still endeavoring to optimize the
flight plan for the aircraft. And, while much of this work would of course
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FIGURE 8. PRIMARY FLIGHT DISPLAY, SHOWING
4-D NAVIGATION INFORMATION
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FIGURE 9. NAVIGATION DISPLAY, IN MAP MODE, SHOWING
4-D NAVIGATION INFORMATION
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FIGURE 10. NAVIGATION DISPLAY, IN VERTICAL PROFILE MODE,
SHOWING MANEUVER OPTIONS
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involve automated functioning, the system will perform these activities in a
largely advisory and assistance capacity, maximizing the expertise of the crew
while unburdening them of time-consuming and distracting tasks.
To perform these functions, the TANDAM system must possess a number of
processing and control capabilities. These capabilities comprise two operational
domains: The utilization of various communications functions, and the
management of tactical and strategic elements of navigation and guidance
functions.
The TANDAM system's management of communications
The TANDAM system will govern two critical aspects of communications
activities: The monitoring and use of on-going situational communications, and
the management of communications with ATC that pertain to clearances. The
TANDAM system's situation-specific management of each of these classes of
communication activity will now be described.
Situational communications -- In service of the TANDAM system's objective
of optimizing aircraft and crew performance, it conducts a number of
communications management activities. For example, in the operational
environment envisioned for this advanced concept, the TANDAM system
provides the FMS with runway and approach assignments that it obtains from
ATIS (or its advanced equivalent) typically just before initial descent. This
acquisition of final flight path assignment is timely as well as useful because it
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affords the FMS substantial time to complete its flight plan, including the
determination of optimal terminal area navigation. It also allows the FMS to
calculate precise waypoint ETAs, etc., in preparation for rapid, yet optimized,
negotiations with CTAS. Lastly, automatic processing of ATIS information
eliminates the potential for crew errors caused by late or erroneous accessing of
ATIS information (a very common cause of "getting behind the aircraft"). The
TANDAM system determines when to obtain the appropriate ATIS information
by considering flight plan information regarding approximate time until landing,
and data base knowledge regarding the schedule for periodic ATIS updates.
After this initial employment of ATIS data, the TANDAM system periodically
monitors ATIS for any changes that might affect the newly established runway
and approach assignments, etc.
In a related communications management activity, the TANDAM system
continually inspects data linked information for data that might significantly alter
the current flight plan (e.g., winds, weather). In a more advanced version of this
capability, the source of this uplinked information would be CTAS -- which
would itself be sending a synthesis of data recently received from other nearby
aircraft and other sources. Whatever the source of this data, the TANDAM
system would have the job of assessing the implications of the new information.
For example, if the TANDAM system receives information about severe clear air
turbulence at a soon to be crossed altitude near, say, the SMO VOR -- and the
system notes that this VOR is closely abeam the aircraft's future flight path -- it
can inform the crew about the likely occurrence of turbulence down route.
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Clearance communications -- The principal communications activities
managed by the TANDAM system are those involved in the negotiation and
acceptance of the complex clearances issued by CTAS. In these activities, the
TANDAM system notes the reception of a CTAS clearance, and interrogates it
for priority level and anticipated data processing requirements (e.g., changing a
crossing altitude while maintaining the crossing ETA would involve new
calculations by the 4-D component of the FMS). In the typical case, the
TANDAM system then loads the clearance parameters into an FMS holding
buffer ready for processing. Based on priority information and time available to
comply, the TANDAM system determines whether to consider evaluating the
clearance for optimality (in terms of aircraft performance); in short, the system
decides whether it should propose a negotiation of the clearance. The system
informs the crew of the clearance, the time until compliance is required, and
whether it recommends negotiation of the clearance's parameters (while still
abiding by its overall intent). In cases where the crew elects to evaluate the
specifics of a clearance (for possible negotiation), the TANDAM system submits
the buffered clearance data to the FMS and requests an estimate of an optimized
compliance with the relevant waypoint(s), etc., and ETA(s). The system also
reminds the crew to communicate compliance with the intent of the clearance,
and their interest in negotiating the specific means of compliance. The resulting
FMS solution (e.g., a delayed and steeper descent that still makes a particular
waypoint on time and saves X pounds of fuel) is made available to the crew for
approval, and is readied for downlink in the negotiation process. Upon reception
of CTAS approval, the modified clearance is WILCOed by the crew. The system
(with crew consent) directs the FMS to edit the flight plan and execute the
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modified clearance. As the compliance point is reached (e.g., at top of descent),
the TANDAM system ensures that actual clearance data (e.g., exact time and
location of descent initiation) is downlinked to CTAS.
The TANDAM system's management of navigation and guidance
Several significant navigation and guidance functions are assisted or managed by
the TANDAM system. These functions support a number of related activities:
clearance negotiation and compliance; anticipation and reaction to situational
changes connected to aircraft performance and environmental factors; and crew-
initiated modifications to flight path management. These activities range in
purview of control from relatively tactical to clearly strategic, and they therefore
involve both FMS and FMCP-oriented governance of flight control and guidance.
Moreover, the form of accommodation the TANDAM system will afford these
navigation activities is greatly constrained by phase of flight and type of function.
Navigation management and clearance negotiation -- As was mentioned
briefly in describing the TANDAM system's support of communications
functions, the system ensures that a newly cleared flight profile appropriately
modifies the FMS's existing flight plan, including all requisite changes in flight
parameters relevant to 4-D compliance. To support the FMS, the TANDAM
system first evaluates data on current environmental conditions (obtained from
sensors and from uplinked reports) and aircraft performance, and then integrates
this information with clearance directives. This precise, updated information is
used to edit the existing flight plan, modifying the flight path and schedule as
57
necessary. In cases where CTAS clearances involve modifications of the vertical
flight regime, a computational module of the FMS that is specialized for
determining optimal vertical maneuvers (in terms of the aircraft's current
performance characteristics) generates a range of solutions that comply with the
clearance. The TANDAM system then directs the FMS to estimate passenger
comfort (based on speed, vertical rate, anticipated turbulence, etc.) and fuel
savings for this range of solutions. The TANDAM system readies the solution set
and accompanying passenger comfort and fuel savings estimates for presentation
to the crew, along with recommendations when appropriate.
The TANDAM system's "cognizance" of flight phase substantially influences its
support of the clearance negotiation function. For example, the previously
described procedure (in the discussion of communications functions) for the
TANDAM system's management of negotiating a clearance was representative of
clearances issued while an aircraft is at altitude, transitioning from Cruise to
Descent phases of flight. In contrast, clearance negotiation procedures conducted
in the terminal area would be automatically modified to be more conservative in
several important respects. Operation at low altitudes and slow speeds, greatly
delimited maneuvering options, and increased proximity of traffic necessarily
constrain the TANDAM system's role in clearance negotiation. In the terminal
area, then, the TANDAM system would consider negotiation only when such
negotiations could clearly serve efforts to lower workload, improve or maintain
situation awareness, increase safety margins, or better satisfy scheduling
preferences. Thus, criteria for the negotiation of terminal area clearances will
not (as in initial Descent) emphasize fuel savings, or perhaps even passenger
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comfort. Instead, negotiations with ATC will be largely limited to supporting
such activities as: Providing ATC with accurate ETAs, etc., to negotiating final
clearances as early in the approach as possible; informing ATC of the aircraft's
readiness for reaching the outer marker at any of a range of ATC-determined
arrival times; and providing ATC with aircraft readiness status for potential
ATC-instigated changes to alternate runways, etc., or even for crew-initiated
negotiations for such runway changes when safe and advantageous.
As an example of this process, Figure 11 depicts a small segment of the
TANDAM system's functioning at a very general level. Specifically, two
interrelated functions are schematicized. For one function, the flow diagram
shows the situational triggers (in one of the cases, the aircraft's proximity to a
significant waypoint, BAYST, and its requisite altitude of approximately 10,000
feet) that cause the TANDAM system's criteria for recommending clearance
negotiations to be modified. In this example, the clearance is optimized for
terminal area (as opposed to Descent phase) navigation. Secondly, the diagram
sketches out the broad factors addressed by the TANDAM system whenever it
must consider recommending a negotiation of a clearance's specific parameters.
In both functions, the TANDAM system interacts with three context-relevant data
sources: The Flight Plan Data Base, containing all significant navigational and
regulatory information germane to the flight route; the Data Link system
through which CTAS-generated clearances and environmental reports will be
received; and the aircraft's sensors and onboard systems that provide positional
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information, performance data, and system status reports. Also evident in this
depiction is the TANDAM system's critical reliance on the 4-D capable FMS.
(The reader is cautioned to understand that this schematic is not meant to be
comprehensive or exhaustive, and does not presuppose a given programming or
computational approach. Rather, its purpose is simply to give a "flavor" for the
general logic involved with the notion of context-sensitive automation.)
Navigation management and position on flight plan -- The TANDAM
system performs a number of functions designed to keep track of and modify the
aircraft's progress in the flight plan, to prepare for upcoming activities, and to
inform or remind the crew about the options available to them at various points
along the planned route. For example, in 4-D navigation, the TANDAM system
monitors progress on the flight path (i.e., performs trajectory tracking),
automatically performing minor adjustments that keep the aircraft on route and
on schedule. When a particular adjustment would exceed a context-sensitive
tolerance, or when such an adjustment might have a significant effect on
anticipated workload, etc., the TANDAM system will inform the crew and offer
options appropriate to the situation.
More generally, the TANDAM system monitors position and time on the flight
path, and compares this information with a flight path data base which stores all
expected significant aircraft events. The TANDAM system determines whether
actual events occur within the expected (data base) parameters, and notes any
deviations from the predicted events, reporting them to the crew when necessary.
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Additionally, the TANDAM system uses this monitoring function to help it
anticipate and prepare for upcoming events. Thus, for example, when the system
notes that the aircraft is about to enter an ATC sector handoff area, it
automatically looks up and loads the new ATC frequency into a pre-select buffer
for crew instigation. Similarly, in those terminal areas where ATC is known to
provide the approach assignment relatively late (thus potentially increasing
workload levels at inopportune times), the TANDAM system can look up possible
approaches (given the already cleared descent and arrival route, approach
restrictions due to winds, visibility, noise abatement, etc.) and rank order them in
terms of probability of assignment. And, in cases where the most probable
approach is appreciably more likely than its competitors, that approach can be
loaded into an FMS pre-select buffer.
At altitude, the TANDAM system's monitoring of progress on the flight plan
allows the system and the FMS to maintain running estimates of position and time
'windows' for maneuver execution such as deceleration schedules, points for
speed break deployment, etc. In the terminal area, monitoring flight path
progress also enables the system (via the FMS) to generate running solutions for
points by which slats, flaps, and landing gear must be deployed, and for times
associated with minimum altitudes and speedsto be achieved, etc.
As was mentioned previously, the TANDAM system also monitors the aircraft's
terminal area flight path progress when the system is calculating running
solutions for possible runway changes late in the final approach. In such cases,
the TANDAM system considers the aircraft's position on its flight path, the
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current environmental and traffic conditions, and relevant airspace regulations in
order to precisely determine several important context-sensitive parameters,
among these being:
The point on the current approach by which the FMS must have the alternate
runway's step-over maneuvers calculated, (in preparation for the earliest
probable runway change clearance);
The point on the current approach at which a step-over maneuver to the
alternate runway would also involve significant speed and/or altitude changes;
and,
The points along the current (and alternate) approach by which checklists
would have to be accomplished, ILS capture, centeflines, etc., would have to
be established, and missed approach sequences would have to be loaded into
pre-select.
The TANDAM system's integration with other systems
As was discussed earlier, the TANDAM system will rely on several advanced
systems to performance its advisory and assistance functions. This reliance on
supporting technologies will also depend on highly integrated software/hardware
systems capable of accurately and rapidly sharing data sets and processing
routines, and maintaining functional redundancy and safeguarding schemes. And,
while the large majority of these supporting capabilities currently exist in limited
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forms, it is clear that substantially advanced versions of these systems would have
to be in place in order to enable the TANDAM system to fully function.
The TANDAM system's integration with the Flight Management
System
As has been mentioned, the TANDAM system requires substantial coordination
with an advanced FMS. In addition to current capabilities, this FMS will (in
order to parallel and complement CTAS capabilities) also have to be capable of
highly accurate and flexible 4-D navigation, demanding rapid and continual re-
calculation of the aircraft's current and future flight path, and its ETAs. These
calculations of time and position information -- coupled with situation-specific
data from onboard systems and sensors, from the flight plan data base (e.g.,
crossing restrictions), and from communications uplinks -- will be used by the
FMS to continuously recalculate precise trajectory and speed solutions necessary
for 4-D maneuvers and aircraft performance optimization. In particular, the
FMS will have to be capable of generating and managing vertical profile
_equences that optimize the aircraft's vertical maneuvers, since CTAS is currently
slated to provide only nominal vertical flight paths in such clearances. The
TANDAM system and the FMS will ensure that these 4-D maneuver solutions are
constrained to preserve acceptable passenger comfort and crew workload. This
4-D maneuver management function (and, in particular, management of the
vertical regime) will be accomplished by means of two critical capabilities: The
FMS's highly integrated coordination with ATC's CTAS (which will supply 4-D
clearance criteria, including route changes), and the employment of an FMS-
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resident algorithmic system (similar to that employed in ATC's ground-based
system) specialized for constructing aircraft-optimized 4-D vertical maneuvers
still compliant with ATC directives. These capabilities will also enable the FMS
and the TANDAM system to assist the crew in responding to unforeseen events
(e.g., pop-up aircraft) by being ready to provide online recalculations, data base
preparations, etc., for facilitating time-critical decision-making.
The TANDAM system's integration with communications systems
In addition to processing sensor, navaid, and performance data, the TANDAM
system communicates with ATC and company sources. In this regard, the
TANDAM system relies heavily on an advanced Data Link system capable of
communicating complex CTAS 4-D clearances, rapid ATC/crew negotiations, and
non-flight-critical and company business. Additionally, the Data Link capability
will support a background-level continuous 'conduit' responsible for sending and
receiving aircraft, environmental, ATC, and company data (referred to in the
flight scenarios presented later as the Most Current Data Exchange Transmission
(MCDET) system). Information downlinked by MCDET will include:
- Weather
- Turbulence levels
- Wind direction and speed
- Temperature
- Barometric pressure
- Estimated visibility
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Aircraft position, altitude, speed, and vertical speed
Course and flight plan data, including waypoint ETAs
Engine and performance data
Weight, and fuel remaining
Requests for non-time-critical company, and ATC data
Certain clearance negotiation data
Uplinked information would include:
• Predicted weather, turbulence, wind, etc., down-route
• Non-time-critical company information, and ATC queries
• Certain clearance negotiation data
This data is used by the TANDAM system and the FMS to update the onboard
flight plan data base, and to provide ATC with the most useful situational
information available. ATC, in turn, will use these continual reports from
individual aircraft to update its data bases,and, consequentially improve its
ability to predict aircraft spacing margins, potential conflicts, arrival times, and
general environmental conditions.
The TANDAM system's integration with the user interface
The functional integration of the TANDAM system with an advanced crew
interface is fundamental to the automation's utility. This crew interface -- a
functionally integrated system of annunciators, displays, and controls that helps
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preserve crew awareness of, and prerogative over, the TANDAM system's
actions and intentions -- is integrated with the TANDAM system in several
respects. The TANDAM system will interact with the crew to assist in making
decisions, alleviating or re-aggregating workload, and enhancing situation
awareness. This assistance is possible as a result of the TANDAM system's
continual "awareness" of situation-specific mission events. In this assistance role,
the TANDAM system tailors the organization of information and
recommendations to be readied for presentation to the crew, such that only
relevant, vital information is proffered first; additional background, secondary
considerations, etc., are provided only upon request (or after crew acceptance of
the automation's suggestions). To ensure against over-reliance on this automated
assistance, the TANDAM system is integrated with the crew interface system such
that it continually has available for the crew information regarding the status of
currently operating automated routines. Moreover, this information also clearly
reflects the automation's processing so as to give the crew an understanding of the
system's "mental" model and "intent." Where applicable, the TANDAM system is
ready to report the potential consequences of its operation. When these
consequences significantly exceed nominal expectations, the TANDAM system
alerts the crew without waiting for their inquiries.
68
OPERATION OF THE TANDAM SYSTEM IN REPRESENTATIVE
DESCENT AND APPROACH SCENARIOS
As mentioned previously, three representative Descent and Approach scenarios
were created in order to demonstrate how the TANDAM system would function
in accord with the onboard systems, the crew, and ATC. These scenarios, all
based on modified versions of published arrivals and approaches, used Los
Angeles' International (LAX) and Orange County's John Wayne (SNA) airports.
These airports were used because MDC research personnel were already familiar
with ATC procedures in the surrounding Los Angeles-area terminal airspaces
(having previously interviewed and observed controllers at both facilities). The
existing arrival/approach sequences are heavily flown, and all are known to
demand fairly substantial workloads, even in ideal conditions. ATC-directed
deviations from the published flight paths are common, some occurring in
virtually every approach into these highly trafficked airports. Even runway
changes (at LAX) occur with a relatively high frequency, and thus must, to
varying degrees, be anticipated in any approach. And, while the number of ATC
interventions contrived for these arrival/approach sequences are probably
unrealistically high (in order to demonstrate significant capabilities of the
TANDAM system), their type and placement are quite representative of
clearances anticipated under CTAS governance.
The scenarios, presented in three multi-page tables (Tables I, II, III), are each
arranged in an abridged function timeline format, moving from one significant
mission event to the next. For each time- and/or fix-marked event, relevant
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ATC/aircraft communications, the TANDAM system's functioning, and crew
involvement are described as appropriate. When significant aspects of
TANDAM's activities warrant special focus, selected Navigation Display formats
are presented.
The SADDE FOUR Arrival into LAX
The first scenario, described in Table I, is based on the SADDE FOUR Arrival
STAR into LAX. In keeping with likely ATC planning for CTAS-governed
airspace, the arrival has been modified to be a profile descent. The modified
SADDE FOUR is shown in Figure 12. In this scenario, it is assumed that CTAS
is fully operational and is directing all navigation, sequencing, and spacing
guidance for the aircraft on its descent and approach. The aircraft is equipped
with an advanced Data Link system, as well as with the TANDAM system and an
FMS capable of 4-D navigation.
A number of clearances are demonstrated in this scenario. At altitude, three
major 4-D clearances are issued by CTAS: Two expedited descents designed to
make the aircraft attain fixes at times substantially earlier than planned; and one
route stretch clearance designed to make the aircraft late, relative to the revised
plan. In these three cases, the scenario in Table I shows how the TANDAM
system might assist the crew in evaluating, negotiating, and complying with the
ATC directives -- and still optimizing the flight plan for aircraft performance
and passenger comfort.
7o

In the LAX terminal area, the scenario depicts the aircraft on its cleared
approach. However, due to various unforeseeable events, the aircraft's approach
is repeatedly interrupted and changed by ATC. In each of these cases, the
scenario describes the TANDAM system's efforts to keep the crew aware of the
latest situation and the aircraft configuration, and poised to respond appropriately
to the eventual final clearance.
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The KAYOH TWO Arrival into SNA
In the second scenario (presented in Table II), the aircraft follows the KAYOH
TWO Arrival STAR into SNA, and transitions to an approach that takes it above
and across the final approach course (see Figure 27). The aircraft is instructed to
continue on its current heading, awaiting vectors to be turned downwind and then
to base, in order to intercept the SNA localizer. In contrast to the first scenario,
the TRACON for SNA (Coast TRACON) is not assisted by CTAS, and does not
have an operational Data Link ground system. To add to ATC's difficulties, it is
responsible for a large and varied population of aircraft types and capabilities,
owing in large part to SNA's proximity to other major civilian and military
airports. The aircraft is again equipped with the TANDAM system and the 4-D
navigation-capable FMS.
This scenario depicts the assistance of the TANDAM system in an ATC
environment not appreciably different from present-day capabilities. The
TANDAM system helps the crew comply with last-minute clearances, and
cancellations of these directives. Additionally, the scenario shows how the crew,
TANDAM system, and FMS together might assist ATC in determining a useful
4-D clearance for the aircraft's final approach.
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FIGURE 27. SCHEMATIC FOR THE KAYOH TWO ARRIVAL INTO SNA
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Preparations for a Possible Runway Change During an Approach to
LAX
This third scenario (depicted in Table III) describes a portion of a standard
profile descent and approach (the LAX CIVET TWO Arrival) in order to
demonstrate how the TANDAM system might assist the crew in preparing for a
possible change in assignment from the currently active 25 Left runway to the
possible alternate 24 Right runway (please see Figure 32). Both CTAS and Data
Link are fully operational. However, in this scenario, the local conditions
quickly become significant factors, with the aircraft flighting a moderate
headwind and flying into steadily worsening weather as it approaches LAX. In
fact, the crew's (and ATC's) major concern involves the possibility of a change in
runway assignments from 25 Left to 24 Right necessitated by airport-area
visibility threatening to drop from Category II to Category III ILS status. In this
scenario, the TANDAM system assists the crew in preparing for the possible side-
step to 24 Right. The TANDAM system monitors positions and times from each
of the runways, and helps the crew perform preparatory activities when they
need to be done, and in an order that optimizes workload and preserves crew
options. These activities -- calculating a running solution for the step-over
maneuver to 24 Right, following all approach constraints, noting significant
maneuvering changes necessary if the alternate runway is assigned, establishing
the last safe point for the step-over maneuver, and setting up for ILS changes,
etc. -- are all critically supported by the capabilities of the TANDAM system.
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FIGURE 32. SCHEMATIC FOR A POSSIBLE RUNWAY CHANGE
DURING AN APPROACH TO LAX
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PLAN FOR EVALUATION OF THE TANDAM SYSTEM CONCEPT
Content and Scope of the Evaluation
The goal of the proposed test of the TANDAM system concept is twofold: To
evaluate the potential for relevant operational benefit of such a system, and to
identify possible shortcomings of the system as it is currently defined. As such,
this evaluation most appropriately should be limited in scope, concentrating on
major functional features of the proposed automation and their potential for
utility in operationally critical (and representative) mission events. This test plan,
therefore, takes as its objective, the goal of defining an investigation of the system
concept's operational value in the context of a limited number of carefully
designed flight scenarios depicting the CTAS-controlled commercial aviation
environment assumed for the near future.
Owing to the currently preliminary status of the TANDAM system concept,
evaluations should entail part-task simulations of its principal functional features
exercised in a moderate-fidelity operational environment. The major capabilities
of the TANDAM system should be prototyped only to levels sufficient to
determine their operational validity, and to determine the effectiveness of their
performance in comparison to relevant baseline conditions. Only after success in
such part-task/limited-prototype evaluations should the development of a full-
scale TANDAM system prototype be considered for more comprehensive
investigation. In this light, the test plan proposed herein should be considered a
necessary and prudent, but not sufficient evaluation of this system concept.
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Preparations for the Evaluation
To conduct the part-task evaluation of the TANDAM system concept, several
preparatory activities will be necessary. First, specific, limited implementation
of the system concept in the context of an advanced flight deck will involve the
development and refinement of an operator interface. This would include
creating the actual means by which subjects can interact with the FMCP, FMS,
and Data Link control heads to affect commands, call up information, etc. These
control activities in turn, will of course need to be connected to software
emulations and/or simulations of significant components of the crew station and
ATC automation. Software modules must be created that are capable of
replicating advanced FMS functions (including 4-D navigation and vertical
maneuver management), Data Link communications, CTAS clearances (including
4-D schedule constraints), and (at least) the principal management and assistance
functions of the TANDAM system. These modules must have access to a fairly
sophisticated relational data base that will contain the relevant parameters of the
scenario's flight plan, and all the mission events and situational variables needed
to trigger automated response.
In addition to the development of the aircraft and ATC simulation/emulation
capabilities, it will also be necessary to specify task timelines associated with the
scenarios used in the evaluation. These detailed descriptions of the operational
environment will be crucial to the precise, "in situo" definitions of the variables
of interest and the associated performance measures used to evaluate them. So,
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for example, the factor of "situation awareness" -- a difficult concept to
adequately define in the abstract -- could be defined in relation to a particular
mission event (e.g., negotiating a clearance), if the operational parameters of that
event have been explicated. With "situation awareness" specified for the relevant
mission event, the determination of how to appropriately measure it (while not
trivial) would follow.
Development of detailed timelines would contribute to two other essential aspects
of the evaluation of the TANDAM system. For one, the timelines would be used
to help specify the mission-event information stored in the relational data base.
Thus, specific timing constraints, maneuver requirements, etc., would be
available to assist in the development of the TANDAM system, FMS, and Data
Link capabilities. Secondly, the timelines would, of course, allow for task-
duration and relative workload comparisons between test conditions.
Research Methodology
Subjects
Subjects will be commercial transport pilots currently flying FMS-equipped
aircraft. Subjects will possess average levels of experience with this type of
aircraft. They will be recruited from current line service situations, and will be
paid for their participation.
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Design
The empirical evaluation of the TANDAM system concept will contrast three
principal factors of interest: The type of Navigation Management, being
accomplished using either an advanced Baseline Crew Station, or the TANDAM
System's Crew Station; the type of ATC Governance, considering CTAS- and
Non-CTAS-Governed environments; and the type of Mission Function,
evaluating performance in an At-Altitude Clearance, a Terminal Area Clearance,
and a Preparation for Runway Change. Two different groups of subjects will
operate the Baseline and TANDAM system's crew stations. Each group will fly
two equivalent descent and approach scenarios, one governed by CTAS and the
other by more current (non-CTAS) ATC control. The order in which subjects
participate in these two scenarios will be counterbalanced to help control for
possible carryover effects. The scenarios will each contain at-altitude and
terminal area clearances, and preparations for a possible last-minute runway
change. Each type of mission function in the scenarios will have been matched
for rough position in the scenario timeline, number of maneuvers required (and
their overall complexity), approximate number and type of fixes and restrictions,
number and type of clearances involved, environmental conditions, and timing
constraints.
Dependent measures will include tracking and waypoint/fix arrival time accuracy,
course, and specific maneuver tracking accuracy (in terms of rms errors), overall
and clearance-specific fuel savings (in pounds of fuel), estimated workload, speed
of responding to ATC clearances, navigation and guidance errors (related to data
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input awareness and understanding of system processing, and anticipation of the
automation's actions), and communications errors. Where appropriate for
purposes of comparison between conditions (where, time, number of maneuvers,
etc., may not be exactly equivalent), dependent measures will be analyzed in
terms of percentages of deviations from optimal performance.
Materials and apparatus
As was mentioned in this section's introductory remarks, the evaluation will be
conducted in a part-task simulation/emulation environment. The principal
components of an MD-11-class cockpit will be employed. However, a number of
significant modifications will also be required. The FMCP will be modified to
incorporate 4-D navigational and guidance capabilities, and a cursor control for
the ND. The FMS MCDU (and associated pages) will be modified to
accommodate the emulated construction and execution of 4-D navigation, and to
provide a control head for the Data Link system. Interface formats and controls
for the TANDAM system will also be provided (please see the system design
section for details on these modifications).
The evaluation software will have to possess part-task simulations of the two
Descent/Approach scenarios, and the TANDAM system's functional capabilities.
Additionally, the software will need to be able to (at least) emulate essential
aspects of 4-D navigation and guidance (onboard and ground-based), and
representative ATC (including CTAS) procedures. A Data Link emulation will
be required to execute the resulting clearance negotiation sequences. Data base
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support for these functions will need to be available. Flight plan information for
the Descent/Approach scenarios will have to be provided to subjects for study
prior to conducting the evaluation.
Procedure
Two sets of subject activities will comprise this evaluation. Firstly, subjects will
receive thorough training (including practice) in the cockpit configuration to
which they have been assigned. For all subjects, this training will include
familiarization with the Descent/Approach routes, and with the FMS, FMCP (and
associated formats), and Data Link system. All subjects will also be trained in
4-D navigation operations, including clearance evaluation and negotiation. This
training will cover CTAS- and Non-CTAS-Governed ATC control. Subjects
assigned to the TANDAM system's crew station will learn procedures and
capabilities specific to its employment.
The second activity, subjects' participation in the evaluation trials, will be
conducted in separate sessions adhering to the counterbalancing assignments, etc.,
described in the Design section. When subjects have completed both scenario
runs, debriefing interviews will be conducted.
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Predictions
Two general hypotheses are made with regard to this evaluation: Use of the
TANDAM system will result in superior crew performance and situation
awareness when compared to use of the conventional advanced (i.e., Baseline)
crew station; and crew execution of descent and approach functions in the CTAS-
Governed environment will be superior to analogous crew activities when not
governed by CTAS. These general hypotheses will be supported by several
specific predictions.
In the At-altitude Clearance conditions, superior performance for the TANDAM
system is predicted to be demonstrated by fewer and smaller deviations from
ATC-assigned waypoint/fix arrival times, more accurate tracking and
maneuvering, and larger estimated fuel savings. These benefits are predicted to
be even more substantial when CTAS is in operation.
Performance resulting from the use of the TANDAM system in the terminal area
is also predicted to be superior to performance in the baseline crew station
conditions. Again, smaller deviations from ATC-determined arrival times, and
more accurate tracking and maneuvering, will evince the TANDAM system's
utility. Additionally, lower and better distributed workload should be indicated
by pilots employing the TANDAM system.
For functions involved in preparing for a possible runway change, the
automation-assisted conditions should, once again, demonstrate better crew
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performance and awareness than the conventionally equipped (i.e., baseline) crew
stations. While superior time-at-waypoint, and control activity accuracy are once
again expected, the critical predictions of superiority here involve the TANDAM
system's assistance with preparations in anticipation of a last-minute clearance.
As such, it is hypothesized that subjects using the TANDAM system's crew station
will exhibit fewer preparation omissions, fewer input and selection errors, and
fewer navigational confusions than will subjects using the baseline crew station.
Furthermore, cockpit activities in the TANDAM system conditions will more
closely approximate ideal sequencing and timing of essential preparations (e.g.,
adhering to scheduled speed reductions, establishing ILS capture, and correctly
setting all maneuver pre-selects for the alternate runway). Because of these
preparatory advantages, crews using the TANDAM system should be well aware
of crucial altitude, speed, and positional differences between the assigned and
alternate runways.
In summary, future real-world implementations of the TANDAM system and
CTAS should expect many operational improvements in the National Airspace
System. These enhancements should include fewer and less serious errors
associated with automation usage, fewer consequent clearance-related violations
(e.g., altitude "busts"), improved situation awareness for the crew (and for
controllers), and better crew cognizance of navigation and guidance automation,
especially with regard to anticipating the automation's actions.
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COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS
SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
The present study has endeavored to define a concept for an automated system
that assists the crew in executing navigation, guidance, and communications
functions during descents and approaches. This automated system, the TANDAM
system, has been designed to take substantial advantage of situation-specific
elements in the aircraft mission. Moreover, the design and development of this
system has attempted to follow human-centered design principles in its
construction of the automation's operational capabilities and associated interface
elements. The functional integration of the TANDAM system with 4-D
clearances, and CTAS in particular, reflects a design philosophy of ensuring the
development of a design concept well situated in the next generation of the
National Airspace System.
This having been said, however, it should be remembered that the automated
system defined in this program has been developed in a solely analytical fashion.
It is, therefore, a legitimate concern that problems may have been overlooked
which were not apparent in the design effort and have remained so, owing to the
lack of critical evaluation under dynamic, temporally realistic conditions. For
this reason, the test plan proposed in the preceding section (or some derivative
thereof) is recommended as the next step in the development of this system.
Whatever evaluative means is used, it is readily apparent that there is still
substantial work to be done to verify that the system is viable.
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Also provided in this research effort is a set of guidelines tailored to the
challenges of automation design. Given the design philosophy adopted herein, it
was no surprise that many of these guidelines directly addressed issues arising
from cases in which automation is designed to take advantage of situation-specific
information to operate at its fullest potential. These guidelines have been
expressly written for crew system designers, but it is hoped that their
applicability will extend to other engineering practitioners as well.
AUTOMATION AND THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM
In the course of conducting these activities, a number of collateral "lessons
learned" have emerged. Chief among these is that it has become quite evident
that, while future automation will benefit from being responsive to all aspects of
the flight environment, none is perhaps more useful than automation that is able
to accommodate the rather substantial capabilities of next-generation ATC. The
advent of CTAS will enable coordinated, safe, and efficient 4-D navigation for
aircraft in virtually every aspect of descent, approach, and landing. CTAS, if
allowed to operate as it has been designed, will improve spacing control and
sequencing efficiency, while minimizing average scheduling delays for all
involved aircraft. But this sophisticated set of capabilities will not be maximally
exploited if the modern commercial transport's airbome communication and
navigation systems are not equally competent partners in the precise control
necessary for accurate 4-D navigation. To consider just one example, an
aircraft's airborne systems will need to be capable of rapidly evaluating ATC
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clearances and determining the aircraft's optimal response in order to allow
negotiation, when desirable. And air traffic controllers, for their part, will need
to effectively customize their directives to optimally control aircraft of that vary
greatly in their ability to comply with such clearances.
With regard to the flight deck automation itself, it is evident that software
systems that can utilize situational cues are at a distinct advantage over systems
that cannot. Even without recourse to more sophisticated computational schemes
(e.g., using mental models of pilot workload), the TANDAM system defined in
this report shows every indication of improving responsiveness to mission plan
demands, and to unanticipated events as well. The prospect of eventually
employing such advanced computational approaches promises the development of
automated systems that more intelligently anticipate and respond to mission
objectives and environmental conditions, and that do so in ways that complement,
and even enhance, human abilities.
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APPENDIX:
GUIDELINES FOR THE DESIGN OF ADVANCED
AUTOMATED SYSTEMS WITH A SPECIAL EMPHASIS
ON ADAPTIVITY
ISSUES REGARDING DESIGN PHILOSOPHY AND GUIDELINES
In this appendix, guidelines are presented for the design of automated systems.
As the title of the document indicates, special emphasis has been placed on
developing guidelines that address design issues relevant to situational and pilot-
state variability, and to the automation's ability to adapt to these contextual
factors, when necessitated by mission requirements.
For the sake of conceptual continuity, the introductory comments, and the
discussion of design assumptions and philosophy presented in the body of the
report are now repeated (in modified form) at the beginning of this appendix.
Introductory Comments
Recommendations and guidelines for the effective design of automated systems
share a number of important characteristics with other design guidelines. For
example, since the human operator often interacts with the automated system,
guidelines regarding the design of an interface are typically relevant. And, since
the automated systems are specialized software and/or hardware systems residing
in the overall avionics system, guidelines for the design of such technologies are,
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of course, pertinent. What makes automation design unique, however, is the need
to establish guidelines advising designers about translating operational and
functional requirements into routines for gathering and interpreting data,
applying rules, etc., and subsequently executing advisories and/or commands to
the aircraft and crew. In this sense, design guidelines for automation must
consider both the system's states and the crew's strategic awareness and
understanding of those states.
Thus, the desire to provide specific, concrete guidelines is often, of necessity,
replaced with the goal of developing guidelines that keep the designer responsive
to the general intent of the design requirement. For example, how a particular
system is programmed may be irrelevant from a design point of view; however,
how it acts (obtains information, processes it, makes interpretations and informs
its users), as a result of that programming, is of central concern to the designer.
It is essential to keep in mind that the designer of an automated system is (or at
least should be) driven by one overriding concern: Satisfaction of mission and
functional requirements. The means by which this automated system satisfies
these requirements must follow two interrelated tenets: The designed system
must be able to effectively accomplish the execution of its identified technical
tasks (e.g., 4-D calculations to a fix must be accurate and timely), and it must be
able to accomplish these tasks in ways that involve, inform, and assist the crew
without also resulting in undue levels of workload, and while still ensuring an
optimal level of situational awareness. Moreover, this second tenet, often
referred to as human-centered design, demands that this inclusion of the human
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operator go well beyond mere accommodation of his or her (unavoidable?)
presence. Human-centered design endeavors to develop technologies that take
advantage of human cognitive and perceptual strengths and preferences, and that
help compensate for human limitations. These guidelines for the design of
automated systems must direct the designer to remain cognizant of human skills
and their possible utility in satisfying the mission and functional requirements.
A human-centered approach to automation presupposes that the human operator
possesses the critical skills and knowledge required for safe, efficient flight.
Researchers and the pilot community both point to such crew assets as the crew's
ability to learn from experience, to make quick, decisive judgements in uncertain,
time-critical situations, and to cope with unanticipated, perplexing problems --
even when these problems have, perhaps, never been encountered before, or
when there may be no one "correct" solution. It is not surprising, therefore, that
most sophisticated efforts in developing artificial intelligence and other "smart"
automated systems focus on these same problem-solving and decision-making
abilities. It is essential that advanced automated systems assist the transport crew
in high-level tasks, if these systems are to be considered genuinely human-
centered. But to be able to perform such functions, automated systems must be
able to monitor and assess several classes of context-sensitive variables: the
rapidly changing situation of the aircraft at any given point in its route, the more
strategic elements of the mission plan (and modifications by ATC and other
external conditions), the crew's cognitive and physical states, and their anticipated
needs and preferences. In these important respects, human-centered automation
must be adaptive, responsive, and accurate. It follows, then, that guidelines for
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the design of automated systems will only be useful if they encourage designers to
remain aware of the mission and its requirements, fully consider relevant human
capabilities and limitations, and take advantage of the situational information that
will allow them to optimize the functional relationship between the automation
and the operators, in service of the mission's goals.
So, to summarize the discussion thus far, the determination of automation
requirements should be based on a thorough understanding of mission
requirements, operational constraints, and human capabilities and limitations.
This understanding is essential since it is on its basis that the designer must
determine what functions and activities, in what contexts, should be accomplished
or assisted by an automated system. This understanding must be both
comprehensive (in terms of mission goals) and procedural (in terms of specific
crew and system decisions and activities) so as to provide the designer with both
strategic and tactical goals for the system design. The understanding of the
mission objectives and operational context -- whether learned from flight phase,
environmental factors, or pilot state -- provide the cuing mechanisms for
enlisting the assistance of the automated system, and for determining what data
must be evaluated and what decisions and actions must be considered.
Assumptions and Choice of Design Philosophy
In any design effort, assumptions must be made regarding mission requirements,
relative level of functional advancement over current capabilities, software and
hardware capabilities, and extent of the system's impact on the integrity of other
159
cockpit systems, and on the crew's procedures. These assumptions in large part
govern the designer's thinking in the design process, and greatly constrain the
design philosophy adopted -- the designer does well to make explicit the
assumptions of the design goal and the consequent design philosophy being
followed. Determination of these assumptions could come from any number of
pragmatic, technical, or theoretical considerations. In human-centered design,
assumptions must be the products of mission requirements and human
information processing capabilities.
In any automation design effort, several assumptions must be made for coherent,
principled designs to be developed. Chief among these are assumptions
regarding:
Software and hardware capabilities -- in any design effort, critical
technologies must be operational in the time frame envisioned for the
automated system.
Determination of the extent of automaticity versus extent of human
involvement -- One decision crucial to the choice of design philosophy is
determining the degree to which the automation will function
autonomously, versus the degree to which dependence on human
monitoring and intervention will be required. This issue of extent of
automaticity is critical since the consequences of a poorly thought out
philosophy in this regard can result, at one extreme, in ineffectual
(minimal) automation and, at the other, in completely opaque and
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surprising (maximal) automated control. Unfortunately, this decision is
too often made on the basis of any number of peripheral criteria --
technical feasibility, for example, or even simple expedience. From a
human-centered design perspective, only the potential for reduced
workload, maintained or increased situational awareness, and the ability to
capitalize on mission-enhancing options should be determinants of the
applicability and extent of automaticity.
However, determining the appropriate extent of automated functioning is
potentially complicated by other tenets of human-centered design. Consider, for
example, two of Charles Billings' (ref. 4) general principles for human-centered
automation:
"To command effectively, the human operator must be involved. (p. 13)"
"To be involved, the human operator must be informed. (p. 13)"
Taking these principles at face value, one could reason that the more involved
(and, by implication, informed) the human operator, the more in command that
operator would be. But, since one of the typical motivations for deciding to
automate is to u___qburdenthe operator from having to be cognizant of all aspects
of a function, -- that is, purposefully rendering the operator less informed about
every detail of the function's execution -- automating could easily be seen as
lessening informativeness and involvement, and therefore being opposed to
Billings' design principles.
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The resolution to this apparent dilemma, of course, lies in what the operator is
informed about. Billings is certainly not recommending that an automated system
should tell the operator about every detail of that system's processing. Rather, he
is recommending that the system (and any context-sensitive mechanisms
supporting it) be crafted such that precisely and only the relevant events, states,
etc., be interpreted for, and reported to, the crew.
To re-couch the issue then, it is perhaps more accurate to say that the appropriate
degree of automaticity is determined by the designer's success in first identifying
the essential operational information required by the operator (for situation
awareness), and then effectively presenting that information to the operator in the
course of the system's execution of the automated function. In this regard, then,
the designer cannot be free to make the arbitrary decision to specify more or less
automated functioning -- done correctly, such decisions can only result from an
understanding of human information processing requirements, and the mission's
functions.
DESIGN GUIDELINES
Analysis of Mission Functions and Determination of Requirements
While not formally part of the design effort, functional analysis and requirements
definition activities are (as the previous discussion attests) essential preparatory
tasks, the results of which greatly shape the eventual design of the automated
system. For this reason, it is recommended that a significant portion of any
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design effort be devoted to a comprehensive treatment of these preliminaries.
Several guidelines should be considered when conducting these activities.
Endeavor to identify functions, not tasks. Since the goal of the designer is
to develop the optimal automated system, working from the more general
information embodied in functions makes it less likely that the new design
will be preemptively constrained to resemble existing tasks (i.e., existing
means of accomplishing underlying functions).
When identifying functions, endeavor to identify contextual factors (e.g.,
phase of flight, weather, crew workload) that may influence how that
function is accomplished. Especially note contextual factors that threaten
to impede the effective and safe execution of that function and subsequent
functions.
Do not limit functional analysis and requirements definition activities to
modified time-line analyses of mission segments. Endeavor to include
indirect information from pilot reports, incident and accident data, and
reviews of technical research. Also, where appropriate, obtain part-task
and in-situo training on relevant technologies and in relevant operational
procedures. Periodically consult subject matter experts, and evaluate the
opinions of these experts based on differences in line experience and
general operational background, beliefs and biases, etc.
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When identifying functions, endeavor to identify functions that appear to
be error prone (even when those errors are typically recognized by crews,
or by onboard or ground-based systems).
When identifying functions, endeavor to identify functions (as currently
instantiated in tasks) that demand high levels of workload or concentration,
take significant amounts of time, or that interfere with, degrade, or do not
promote situation awareness.
when identifying functions, endeavor to note contingency relationships
between functions, especially when execution of a function has significant
consequences for several concurrent or subsequent functions. In
particular, look for cases in which the execution of a function determines
or substantially restricts the options, performance, etc., of contingent
functions, since such cases are logical candidates for automated assistance.
When identifying functions in existing systems, endeavor to note cases in
which the same or similar functions are accomplished differently. In such
cases, attempt to ascertain the reasons for these operational differences
(e.g., due to situational changes such as differences in altitude or
maneuvering area, or due to artifacts of previous design decisions such as
executing a maneuver through an FMS input versus through a FCP
command). Such functions may have situation-specific requirements for
automated assistance.
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When instances of present-day automation are encountered, endeavor to
ascertain the logic behind the automation, including the employment of all
its modes and situations of operation. Rather than uncritically accept,
question the implicit or explicit design decisions embodied in the
automation in order to lessen the tendency to bias the design of new
systems.
Automated System Capabilities
When determining the capabilities required of the automated system, the designer
must consider (at least) two classes of capability: Capabilities related to mission
functions and their operation in coordination with the crew and ATC, and
capabilities related directly to the processing and interpreting of situation-specific
information to be used in the cuing of automated routines.
Operational capabilities
When determining operational capabilities required by the automated
system, the scope of the automation's functional control must be identified
(e.g., automated control of all landing maneuvers via an Autoland system)
and every effort must be made to catalog this automated control's
consequences on related systems and procedures. The potential
consequences of the automation's scope of control can include everything
from the designer's intended improvements in operational performance, to
unintended control over-rides and inadvertent activation (or inhibition) of
165
other systems. Test phase evaluative processes such as Failure Modes and
Effects Analyses (FMEAs) are often used to identify the consequences of
the newly developed system's implementation. Analytic processes similar
to FMEAs should be used to evaluate automated system concepts early on
in design. (This recommendation, of course, is easier said than done. For
such evaluative processes to be effective, a rather sophisticated and
comprehensive model of the proposed system [and the overall crew station]
must already be articulated to some degree. It is a simple fact of most
concept design efforts that this level of system specificity is not yet defined.
In this more typical case, it is recommended that the designer endeavor to
continually question and explore the potential consequences of the
operational capabilities posited for the candidate system).
When defining operational capabilities of the proposed automated system,
the designer should not be quick to abandon design concepts that meet with
initial criticism or skepticism that is based on current operational realities
or conventions. Instead, the designer should use these comments,
objections, etc., as rather decisive feedback about the proposed design, and
should consider them seriously and respond to them substantively.
(However, this encouragement of innovation notwithstanding, the designer
is reminded that the great majority of innovative concepts are legitimately
rejected on technically, operationally, or pragmatically sound grounds.)
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Adaptive capabilities
In cases where the designer has determined that context-sensitive automated
routines would be advantageous to more effectively accomplish mission
functions, the specific contextual cues required for these automated
routines must be expressly identified and the feasibility of their
implementations assessed.
When contextual information is under consideration as a cue for automated
routines, the designer should endeavor to determine the relative predictive
value of that information. While degree of predictability, per se, can not
always be easily or accurately characterized, it is often possible to look for
co-occurrence or precedence relationships between the to-be-automated
function and potentially predictive contextual cues. In many cases, such
correlational relationships can be of substantial value, especially in
automated systems designed to act as decision aids for crew-executed
functions. Partially predictive contextual information is also valuable since
it may well form a substantially stronger predictor if paired with other
partially predictive contextual information.
In identifying context-specific information sources, the designer must not
only appraise the relative utility of the information as an input source for
the automation, but must also endeavor to ascertain the information's
veracity, accuracy, and reliability. Such information sources should also
be evaluated in terms of possible negative consequences of their
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employment. These concerns should include crew complacency, skilled
degradation, and over-dependence, especially as they may relate to cases in
which such information sources (and subsequent automated activities) are
disrupted or lost altogether.
System Interface and Operational Considerations
Several aspects of user interface requirements are relevant to the design of
automation. In particular, interface issues related to context-specific cuing of
automated systems must be considered by the designer. A relatively
comprehensive treatment of these issues is offered by Billings (ref. 4) in his
NASA technical memorandum, "Human-Centered Aircraft Automation: A
Concept and Guidelines." Guidelines derived from his treatise -- and guidelines
inspired by it -- are presented in this section on controls, displays, and formats.
Controls, displays, and formats
• Design automated tasks to be similar to and compatible with pilot task
performance.
• Base the decision to announce partial or incipient failures upon pilot needs
and system functional redundancy.
• Do not design control automation capable of failing without unambiguous
and apparent annunciation to the pilot.
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Consider the consequences of system failures when designing automated
systems; if these consequences are significant, design the automation to
assist the crew in dealing with the failure(s). Whenever possible, design
the automation and its procedures to be understandable in their diagnosis,
trouble-shooting, and problem solving activities.
• Design the automation to warn the pilot when the limits of safe operation
are being approached.
• Design the automation to either prevent the selection of unsafe operating
modes or to warn the pilot of their potentially hazardous consequences.
• Prevent the automation from taking irreversible/irrevocable actions that
could lead to hazards or mishap.
Consider designing the automation to operate under "delimited authority."
"Delimited authority" implies that the automated system must be designed
to conduct situation assessment sufficiently early to inform the crew of
upcoming events, activities, or possible problems -- and yet not so early as
to render such information premature or needlessly speculative (due to
uncertainties in the ongoing flight situation).
• Do not impose "hard" limits on the pilots' authority to fly the aircraft
throughout its operating envelope.
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• Provide soft limits which alert the pilot that the normal flight envelope has
been reached.
Cleady annunciate or otherwise indicate to the crew that their actions are
in excess of nominal or typical operating limits, and consider informing
them precisely as to how long, etc., such limit-exceeding activities can
safely be continued.
• Clearly inform the crew as to how to regain nominal operating parameters
after such limit-exceeding activities have ceased.
• In general, do not design automated systems to be uninten'uptable, either in
control execution or in processing activities related to such execution.
Do not permit easy-access pilot overrides to disengage or nullify systems
operating along with or alongside the overridden system; any
circumvention of automation must be done purposefully and with adequate
knowledge of the consequences of the circumvention.
• Reduce the workload associated with conducting navigation and guidance
functions during terminal area operations.
Consider developing automation which can adapt to the workload situation
by providing more or less support as the situation requires. For example,
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during low workload periods the automation could solicit crew inputs in
decision making and options evaluation, in high workload, such activities
could tend to be addressed by the automation.
• Seek to optimize rather than minimize the level of workload, since low
workload may also degrade crew performance and awareness.
Consider providing meaningful tasks to enhance pilot situation awareness
and to ensure that the pilot can effectively resume full control of the
aircraft in the event of a failure or other contingency.
• Consider requiting pilot consent when it is reasonable to do so as a means
of maintaining pilot involvement during largely automated operations.
Design automated systems to communicate the consequences of inputs,
preselects, etc., on aircraft operation, especially those likely to result in
errors and out of tolerance conditions not easily detected by casual human
observation.
Increase the error resistance of automated systems and their associated
displays by designing clear, simple display formats and by providing
unambiguous responses to commands.
• Perform safety hazard analyses of display and control use to identify
instances where errors may be committed.
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Consider designing automation to incorporate the highest possible degree
of error tolerance by proscribing either potentially hazardous commands
or by providing the pilot with unambiguous warning of the hazardous
consequences associated with the implementation of such commands.
When preparing to design or modify an automated system, review accident
and incident data on a frequent basis in order to identify and correct human
and machine related design deficiencies.
Design automation to be flexible enough to accommodate the full range of
pilot abilities which can be expected to be employed during all phases of
aircraft operation.
Design automation to provide pilots with control and management options
appropriate to phase of flight environment, and other situation-specific
contexts. Consider having the automation judiciously assist in determining
what no___Atto provide also.
• Present information to the pilot in a form that will maintain or enhance
situation awareness.
Determine the information needs of pilots that do not vary from situation
to situation, and ensure that this data is available for presentation to pilots
in a form which is useful for all flight situations.
172
Determine the specific information needs of each flight situation, and
evaluate the utility (and consequences) of presenting this data to the pilots
only when needed. Ensure that the presentation is in a form which
optimally supports the specific task.
• Do not provide flight critical information to pilots unless its level of
validity has been ascertained.
• Provide some indication to pilots when questionable data is being presented
to them.
• Provide pilots with critical information concerning the status of both the
automation itself as well as the components controlled by that automation.
Design automated systems to assist pilots in dealing with the situation of
automation failure, especially in the context of very reliable systems. Have
prepared for presentation, information on the consequences of such
failures, and on a ready means of executing crew/automation compensatory
actions.
• Consider providing warnings to the pilots when their actions are expected
to have potentially negative consequences.
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Pilots must be able to accurately predict and understand the automation's
actions and processes.
Design systems, where ever possible, to prevent hazardous interactions
from occurring, and where prevention is not practical or feasible, to
minimize the effect of their occurrence.
Pilots should be provided with the information necessary to improve their
awareness of potentially serious situations, and to improve their trust in the
automated systems. The designer should endeavor to not make this
presentation of information (e.g., trend data) degrade overall situation
awareness or increase workload.
When warnings occur which are not time-critical, pilots will attempt to
evaluate the validity of such warnings. When of use to them, means should
be provided for the crew to conduct these evaluations quickly and
accurately.
Warnings and cautions must be unambiguous. When common signals are
used to denote more than one condition, there must be a clear indication of
the specified condition responsible for the alert. For example, accompany
summary signals, such as a master caution and master warning, with a clear
indication of the specific condition responsible for activation of the alarm.
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Consider allowing the automation to take the first corrective action during
emergency conditions and then informing the crew of the situation so that
they can intervene as required.
• Minimize false or nuisance warnings in order to reduce pilot workload and
increase their confidence in the warning systems.
Provide trend information to the pilots before parameters reach levels
requiting immediate pilot action, in order to alert them to the existence of
potentially serious situations.
• Provide means for the pilots to quickly and easily evaluate the validity of
all warnings.
• Present all wamings and alerts to the pilots clearly and unambiguously.
When designing information declutter schemes, consider limiting the
information presented to the pilots to that which is needed to maintain
situation awareness, and to accomplish the tasks required in the current
flight situation. The automated system should manage the display of
information for subsequent portions of the mission such that the crew can
always have strategic look-ahead access.
Consider providing pilots with the capability to selectively declutter their
displays based on their assessment of what is needed in each flight situation.
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In such declutter choices, the automation should still alert the crew to any
vital information.
Declutter displays by displaying only that information which the pilot
routinely needs to perform the current task, but provide the capability to
rapidly access additional information if the need arise.
• Ensure crew awareness of updating of all data bases and system status
relevant to mission completion parameters.
• Interpret information requirements with particular emphasis on type of
integration prerequisites, information timing, transfer rates, etc.
• Provide a positive high level indication of the automation status of each
subsystem.
Provide information on the status of all controlled components and
functions associated with each automated subsystem in the event of an
automation failure.
• Develop "graceful" degradation schemes for all automated systems that
assist the crew in a broad range of failure conditions.
• Consider locating the most important information in the center of the
display.
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• Consider reinforcing visual information with auditory or tactile
information where high visual workload exists.
• Ensure that there is no interference between voice alerts or messages that
might reduce their effectiveness.
Consider back-driving functionally coupled control systems (e.g., stick and
throttle) to increase situation awareness during automatic modes of
operation.
When designing automation that takes the crew through a sequence of
inspection or evaluative steps (e.g., with electronic checklists) consider
providing the following features:
o Prompting of the crew when a checklist needs to be performed.
o Reminding the crew of items still to be completed.
o Acknowledging pilot confirmation of actions.
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Information
Information requirements must be derived principally from
mission/functional requirements. These requirements can be strategic
(e.g., flight planning) or tactical (e.g., the capability to make emergency
maneuvers) in nature. Information requirements include not only the
actual content needed (e.g., airspace sector data, fuel bum rate), but also
requirements regarding access speed, size and number of active and
background buffers, relational structure and cross-referencing, and
updating capabilities. Additionally, all relevant aspects of the data base
should be readily accessible to the crew for inspection, and, in appropriate
cases, editing.
When determining the updating scheme, the designer should consider such
automation devices as "hot" updating as long as updates are made to all
relevant data locations and associated computational routines (e.g., rule
systems). In such cases of automated updating, the consequences of the
updates should be evaluated by the system and any counterintuitive, unusual
or otherwise unanticipated changes of significance to the mission should be
communicated to the crew. In such designs for the updating function,every
effort should be made to not burden the crew with unnecessary reports.
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Human aspects of "intelligent" processing
When any form of artificially "intelligent" processing is employed, the
system must be able to inform the crew about the level of veracity,
accuracy, and reliability of the processing, given the data, etc., it is
considering. Confidence levels for decisions, etc., and possible
consequences of erroneous conclusions of the system's processing must be
apparent to the crew.
When any form of artificially "intelligent" processing is employed, the
system's design (and the associated training curriculum) should assist crew
members in forming and maintaining a conceptually accurate mental model
of all significant aspects of the system's processing. This knowledge of the
automated system's processing should include awareness of the system's
strengths, weaknesses, characteristic solutions, etc.
When any form of artificially "intelligent" processing is employed, the
system's design should be such that, for relevant cases, the crew can readily
determine 'where' the automated system is in a given processing routine
(e.g., a decision-making routine). Similarly, the crew should be able to
readily determine subsequent steps in the processing of that routine. The
designer must determine (from requirements) if and when the crew
interface should be able to interrupt or edit an automated system's
"intelligent" processing. In such cases, the automated system must be able
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to inform the crew members about the effects of their intercession(s) with
the processing routine.
Reasoning, judgement, and decision making -- In the design of automated
systems employing artificial "intelligence," the designer needs to be aware of
human cognitive strategies and biases, and needs to capitalize on, and/or
compensate for, these characteristics of human information processing. Human
reasoning employs strategies and biases in both syllogistic and conditional
reasoning (i.e., logically deterministic), and in information-incomplete situations.
A number of these human processing characteristics are relevant to the design of
automated systems.
Processing characteristics in syllogistic and conditional reasoning. In
situations in which problem-solving and decision-making can be solved by logical
syllogism or by conditional ("if-then") reasoning -- that is, by deterministic
means -- humans often exhibit processing strategies and biases that deviate from
the strict logical appraisal of premises and conclusions. These processing
characteristics are particularly likely to be employed in time-critical and high
workload situations, and when the number or complexity of decision factors, or
potential solutions, is great. The designer is cautioned to keep the following
processing characteristics in mind whenever developing decision-making and, in
particular, decision-aiding systems, involving syllogistic or conditional reasoning.
Research shows that people sometimes misinterpret or fail to fully consider
the logical premises involved in a decision-making task. For example,
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instead of considering all possible meanings of a premise, people will
interpret the premise as having only one meaning. Similarly, people will
sometimes consider only a subset of the possible combinations of logical
premises (based on simplicity or on preferences). In these cases, people
will mason from such limited interpretations of the premises, thereby
drawing potentially erroneous conclusions.
There is substantial evidence that, in logical reasoning, people will fail to
accurately consider the consequences of negative information about
premises. For example, if a given premise is false (thereby logically
rendering false the conclusion to the syllogism or condition), people will
sometimes persist in accepting the conclusion as valid. Similarly, people
tend not to consider counterexamples (to a logical argument) in evaluating
the veracity of a conclusion (i.e., in deciding whether a given conclusion
could be contradicted). Moreover, there tends to be a cognitive processing
bias against seeking any negative (disconfirming) evidence when
conducting logical reasoning.
Research indicates that people sometimes evaluate the veracity of logical
conclusions on the basis of their beliefs instead of on the logical grounds
supporting or refuting those conclusions. In particular, people have a
stronger tendency to accept a believable but invalid conclusion than to
accept an unbelievable yet valid conclusion.
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Empirical evidence suggests that a person in a situation of syllogistic or
conditional reasoning, will tend to generate a conclusion consistent with the
logical problem's premises, accept it as valid, and cease considering other
possible conclusions. This "confirmation" bias may, in part, explain why
people tend to have difficulty seeking and considering disconfirming
evidence (see preceding guidelines for discussion).
Processing characteristics in reasoning under uncertainty. In real-
world situations, typical problem-solving or decision-making involves reasoning
in the context of incomplete, degraded, or misleading information. The
empirical study of such "reasoning under uncertainty" has revealed a number of
cognitive strategies and biases characteristically employed by humans. The
designer is advised to keep the following in mind when designing automated
decision-aiding routines, etc.:
Research shows that, when people attempt to estimate probabilities of
altemative outcomes, they sometimes base these subjective probability
estimates on how frequently they have encountered this type of outcome,
and not on its probability. Consider the following example: Hypothetical
final approach A was a possible outcome in five approaches and was shown
to be selected in four of those approaches, and final approach C was
possible in twenty approaches and was shown to be selected in ten of those.
In such cases, pilots would tend to predict that approach C is more likely to
occur in a future clearance than is approach A (even though the probability
of A's occurrence, .8, is substantially higher than C's, .5).
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Research indicates that people's judgements of probabilities of occurrence
are often influenced by how readily examples of such occurrences come to
mind. This "availability" heuristic suggests that subjective probability
estimates can be heavily biased by particular personal experience and by
memory.
In assessing the degree of agreement between decision accuracy and
decision confidence, it has been shown that people tend to be over-
confident in cases of relatively high (but not perfect) decision accuracy.
There is some evidence suggesting that this tendency to exhibit more
confidence than the accuracy of the decision warrants is due to people's
incomplete analyses of the decisions being made.
When estimating the probability that two independent events (e.g., that
accidently leaving your front door unlocked would occur on the same day
that a burglar checks all the doors in the neighborhood), research has
shown that people tend to substantially over-estimate the probability that
both events will occur. It is believed that such inaccuracies in subjective
probability estimation arise from people's tendency to ignore, or not fully
consider, the base-rate probabilities connected with each of the events.
Instead, people tend to believe some connection or correlation must exist
between the events since they co-occurred, thereby (erroneously)
increasing their estimates of the conjoint event's likelihood.
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Empirical research reveals that people will greatly over-estimate the
likelihood that information obtained in a small number of random
observations will be representative of a more general pattern or trend.
Research shows that, due to memory limitations and processing biases,
people do not accurately estimate the degree of relatedness between (i.e.,
the correlation) events. Nevertheless, when underlying correlations
between events are strong, peoples' estimates of relatedness (and therefore,
predictability) are largely in accord with actual correlations.
In contrast to this general tendency, it is sometimes the case that people will
judge a significant relationship to exist between events when, objectively,
there is no correlational evidence of one. This phenomenon of "illusory
correlation" is believed to reflect people's tendency to make subjective
probability estimates of relatedness (in the absence of actual correlational
evidence) on the basis of implicit theories or beliefs -- in effect, people find
patterns where they want to. It is significant to note that people's beliefs in
such illusory correlations are difficult to change, even being resistant to
direct contradictory evidence.
Research has shown that, in real-world situations, instead of following
idealized or optimal decision-making strategies, people prefer to follow
strategies that yield clear choices, that involve little or no probability
estimating or computation, and that are readily understood and defended.
For example, instead of weighing all merits and shortcomings of a
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decision's alternatives, people will sometimes evaluate _ the relative
merits of the alternatives, or _ the relative shortcomings in their
decisions. In another commonly employed strategy, people choose from
among decision alternatives by first ranking important features of the
altematives, and then eliminating alternatives that don't possess the highest
ranked feature, then that don't possess the next highest ranked feature, etc.,
until only one alternative remains.
Empirical studies have demonstrated that when people engage in real-world
decision-making activities, they attempt to take into account the costs
involved in making those decisions. People consider the options lost by
deciding (therefore sometimes delaying or avoiding the decision), the time
involved in evaluating alternatives, the number and complexity of the
alternatives (and their relative merit), and the extent of differences (i.e.,
dissimilarity) between the alternatives. When uncertainty is high, or when
the potential consequences of an erroneous decision are serious, people will
sometimes hedge their decisions (e.g., selecting a non-optimal altemative
that allows options to remain available), or will knowingly take overly
conservative, but safe, choices.
Tailored apprising of aircraft systems status, and of consequences of
current situation --
* To the maximum extent possible, aircraft system status information, etc.,
should always be available to the crew upon request. And all standard
caution and alert information should be clearly and unambiguously
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annunciated to the crew in accord with established and validated
priorty/crificality schemes. Such schemes should be able to accommodate
any relevant context-specific information which might improve their
utilization. In no case, however, should context-specific augmentation of
such schemes be able to result in a dangerous, misleading, or otherwise
unhelpful modification.
In cases where it has been determined that context-sensitive automated
routines would enhance the capability of a status and alerting system,
certain design principles should be adhered to. First, all standard status,
caution, and alerting capabilities must not be impeded in any way;
therefore, all automated assistance must be limited to advisory functions.
Within this role, the automated component of a status and alerting system
should evaluate the status of the aircraft in the context of the aircraft's
current flight situation. This examination should attempt to evaluate the
current and future status of involved systems when such status is not
readily determinable by direct sensor readings, equipment tolerance bands,
etc., not by algorithmic system inspection routines. Instead, this evaluation
should attempt to use available system status data sources, knowledge of the
flight situation, and diagnostic routines designed to predict status in cases of
incomplete or inaccurate data. In addition to providing the best possible
diagnoses, such probabilistic analyses should clearly and concisely inform
the crew about the confidence level of the diagnoses, relevant alternative
possibilities, and significant consequences (positive and negative) of
accepting or rejecting the diagnoses. The designer should consider that the
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automated system may be required to estimate near-term and long range
trends in aircraft system functioning, including potential for eventual
partial or complete malfunction. Such appraisals should also include
predictions regarding collateral effects on interrelated systems.
Extent and type of crew awareness and involvement in automated
processes
In general, the automated system should minimize human involvement in
tasks that interrupt or otherwise impede the ability to remain aware of the
current aircraft situation and its occupied airspace, or that lessen the extent
to which the human can anticipate and speculate about significant upcoming
events. This being said, there are some obvious difficulties in heeding this
advice. First, many of the tasks implicated above also produce involvement
in, and awareness of, important flight-related functions -- minimizing crew
participation in such cases could simply improve awareness in one area at
the cost of eliminating it in another. Second, determining that a given task
or function actively reduces awareness (and, for that matter, that a given
automation routine improves awareness), is not always straightforward
since actual empirical measurement of situation awareness is, at best,
equivocal. For these and other reasons, recommending guidelines for level
of awareness, etc., perhaps just acts to obscure the goal of the designer -- to
develop a system that exploits human capabilities, compensates for human
weaknesses, and robustly satisfies the mission's requirements. In sum,
187
extent and type of crew involvement should be determined by design
efforts sensitive to human-centered principles.
Factors Related to the Automated System's Functional Architecture
While the design and implementation of an actual functional architecture is
principally the responsibility of software and hardware developers, the designer
can and should substantially influence the direction and scope of such activities
since the system's eventual capabilities often pivot on how a design concept is
implemented. To this end, the designer should understand the technologies and
techniques involved, and should have a reasonably informed appreciation for the
kinds of functional requirements, etc., that will drive software and hardware
engineers to make the choices they do. Some factors relevant to these concerns
are now discussed.
Types of situation-adaptive mechanism used to cue automated routines
Parasuraman, Bahri, Deaton, Morrison, and Barnes (ref. 15) identify three
classes of "adaptive" mechanisms to be considered in the design and
implementation of context-sensitive automation: Mechanisms that empirically
assess pilot state and performance; mechanisms that model or theoretically
represent (and thus predict) pilot state, performance, or intentions; and
mechanisms that use mission requirements, events, etc., and situation-specific
information. These classes of mechanism are now considered with respect to
their potential utility.
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Empirical assessment of pilot state and performance -- Empirical
evaluation of pilot state typically considers mental and/or physical workload,
situation awareness, vigilance, and fatigue. Evaluation of pilot performance
generally focuses on aspects of task execution (duration, accuracy, and nature of
performance errors), and the effects of this execution on other tasks (done in
parallel or subsequent to the task under evaluation). In empirical assessments of
state or performance, it is typically assumed that such data will, of course,
constitute crucial information for the triggering of automated routines --
however, such obtained data does not, in and of itself, cause the automated
routines to be initiated. Instead some rule system, etc., taking this empirical data
as inputs, must still specify when and how a given automated routine will be
employed. Even so, the designer's critical appraisal of the quality and timeliness
of such data is essential since the adaptive decision scheme (e.g., rule system) is
largely dependent on it.
With regard to assessment of pilot state, the designer must decide whether
physiological (e.g., heart rate), and/or subjective (e.g., pilot workload
ratings) measures will be employed. In either case, the designer must
endeavor to use the most technically and statistically reliable, accurate, and
non-intrusive measures available. In addition, serious consideration should
be given to practical concerns such as: How much and what kind of data is
required, signal processing complexity (in the case of certain physiological
measures), and the relative discriminability or diagnosticity that these
measures are likely to provide (e.g., to date, physiological indices of
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mental activity are only able to distinguish relatively general conditions of
cognitive processing. Their functional utility with regard to, say, inferring
specific intent, is virtually nil.)
With regard to assessing workload, the designer should determine what
aspects of workload would be potentially useful as cuing mechanisms (e.g.,
visual versus auditory workload; mental workload associated with decision
making versus with remembering), and which of these might be reliably
obtainable.
When employing empirical assessment, the system must be able to interpret
the functional significance of distinguishable differences in pilot state or
performance; differences that are discernable but not interpretable are of
little use as cuing mechanisms.
Models of pilot state, performance, or intention -- Parasuraman, Bahri,
Deaton, Morrison, and Bames (ref. 15) identify several types of modelling
approaches to representing (and predicting) pilot-related variables: Models that
can represent aspects of pilot workload (e.g., involving task-related changes in
workload), models of cognitive processing (e.g., "executive" processing models),
and models of pilot performance and intention (e.g., queuing theory models, and
intent inferencing systems). In some contrast to the empirical mechanisms
discussed previously, modelling approaches have often integrally combined the
modelling of pilot states, etc., with some set of strategies, rules, etc., for directly
triggering an adaptive automated routine. As such, the designer's evaluation of
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modelling approaches must consider both how well a given model predicts the
relevant pilot variable (e.g., workload), and how effectively the model's
strategies, rules, etc., perform their adaptive function for initiating automated
assistance.
When considering the use of a model for predicting a pilot variable, the
designer should, whenever possible, obtain statistically rigorous validity
and reliability indices successfully comparing the model's predictions with
empirically obtained indicants of the pilot variable of interest.
Additionally, the designer should verify that the model's input
requirements, etc., can be satisfied for the situation (e.g., mission segment)
to be modelled.
When considering the use of a model for predicting a pilot variable, the
designer should verify that the model appears to be more efficient than (or
otherwise preferable to) representing the pilot variable empirically.
When considering the use of a model to predict a pilot variable, the
designer should compare the modelling approach to rival approaches,
evaluating it for strength of predictability, scope of applicability, number
and value of beneficial features, ease of implementation, and risks
associated with software/hardware technologies and programming
techniques employed.
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Mission events and situation-specific cues -- Parasuraman, Bahri,
Deaton, Morrison, and Barnes (ref. 15) refer to the use of mission events for
prompting automated sequences as employing "critical event" logics. These
authors adopt Barnes and Grossman's (1985) typology of such logics:
Emergency logic, in which a control process is executed without pilot
intervention initiation or intervention...
Executive logic, in which the subprocesses leading up to the decision to
activate the process are automatically invoked, with the final decision
requiring the pilot's input...
Automated display logic, in which all non-critical display findings are
automated to prepare for a particular event, so that the pilot can
concentrate on the most important tasks. (p. 18)
Several mission and situation-specific events can be employed in such critical-
event logics, among them being:
- Mission phases, segments, etc.
- Current and planned aircraft position and performance data
- Crew inputs (whether correct, erroneous, absent, or delayed)
- ATC inputs
- Current and anticipated environmental conditions
- Time requirements
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- Emergencies, malfunctions, and other abnormal conditions
When considering the use of a critical-event scheme as an adaptive
mechanism, the designer should continually evaluate how that critical-event
logic satisfies mission functions. Moreover, since critical-event logics are
particularly dependent on mission events, this ongoing evaluation should
consider the critical-event logic's potential for success in future
applications (in which mission functions are likely to change), and in near-
term applications involving retrofit issues, operations in mixed fleets, and
interactions with variable ATC capabilities.
When considering the use of a critical-event logic as an adaptive
mechanism, the designer must understand the logic's effects on collateral
and subsequent events in the mission to the maximum extent possible. This
understanding must be both tactical and strategic, and must consider
unlikely and critical situations as well as expected nominal performance.
And the designer is reminded that, since the rule systems, etc., governing
critical-event schemes will typically incorporate some
deterministic/conditional logic (e.g., if-then sequences), evaluating the
effects of the critical event scheme necessarily entails evaluating all
outcome possibilities of these rules (even seemingly innocuous, trivial, or
null outcomes).
• When considering the use of a critical event logic as an adaptive
mechanism, the designer must have a clear idea of what failures and
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malfunctions in the critical-event scheme will look like. The designer must
not only have a means for identifying such anomalies, but must ensure that
the automated system can, where possible, 'trap' for them (i.e., by
programming, etc., preempt their occurrence), annunciate relevant aspects
of their etiologies and effects when they do occur, and provide means for
compensating for these occurrences.
When considering the use of a critical-event logic as an adaptive
mechanism, the designer should keep in mind Parasuraman, Bahri, Deaton,
Morrison, and Barnes' (ref. 15) criticism of such schemes:
The problem with these [critical-event logic] systems is that they
are relatively unsophisticated and are unresponsive to actual operator
workload or performance, it is even possible that their rule bases
have unforeseen, interactive consequences in a complex environment.
(p. 18)
As such, the designer should consider following a design philosophy that
is biased toward relatively low autonomy for the automated system,
since, in critical-event applications, the crew and ATC typically
constitute vital elements of the system's overall "intelligence" and
decision-making capability.
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Programming and computational techniques used to control
automated systems
Several classes of programming and computation can be employed in
implementing automated systems, including the following:
- Standard algorithmic and related rule-based techniques
- "General case plus variant" modelling (e.g., frame-based
programming)
- "Judgement" and "Reasoning" programming designed to work in
circumstances involving uncertain or poorly understood parameters
- Probabilistic and estimating techniques, including "neural network
systems"
• When deciding to use a computational or programming technique, the
designer should consider the technique's ability to help satisfy the
software requirements previously derived from the automated system's
design requirements (which, in turn, should follow from the mission's
and the human operator's requirements). In many cases, it may turn out
that various requirements are better addressed by particular techniques
and, thus, different components of the automated system may be
supported by different programming approaches. A number of these
software requirements are considered below.
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When deciding on a programming approach, the designer should
have determined operationally representative estimates of timing
requirements for data search, loading, etc., for central processing
(e.g., decision-making), and for interaction with the system
interface.
When deciding on a programming approach, the designer should
endeavor to ascertain the system's required computational capacity in
terms of amount and complexity of computing. This might be
achieved by estimating peak calculation rates, number and
complexity of parallel computations potentially required, etc.
0 When deciding on a programming approach, the designer should
endeavor to determine the levels of certainty, accuracy, etc., to be
required by the automated system's (operational) functioning.
Where applicable, when deciding on a programming approach, the
designer should ascertain the extent of uncertainty, ambiguity, etc.,
inherent in the functional phenomenon being modelled or estimated
since certain computational techniques are specialized for such
situations.
When deciding on a programming approach, the designer should
endeavor to employ the computational techniques least likely to
produce erroneous, inconclusive, obsolete, or misleading outputs,
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and yet still fulfill the design requirements for the automated system.
Such selections of low risk programming techniques must, of course,
be weighed against the potential losses in computational
sophistication and power that might have been provided by more
high risk techniques.
When deciding on a programming approach, the designer should
evaluate the ease, flexibility, and power of the approach to
implement operator interact and system integration functions.
In cases where a requirement has been established for the automated
system to produce a solution (e.g., a decision), etc., that resembles or is
consistent with the corresponding human solution, the software should
mimic the human cognitive processes, strategies, and preferences
leading to that solution only when:
It is generally believed that some advantage exists (e.g., better
solution, faster decision) for the solution obtained by human
cognitive processing, and/or
There appears to be some collateral benefit afforded the operator
(e.g., improved confidence in the solution, improved situation
awareness) by him or her recognizing and agreeing with the
system's processing.
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With regard to this consideration, the designer should endeavor to
determine the extent to which the automated routine must be able to
report partial solutions (e.g., a best estimate when only half through the
required processing) or other interim processing (e.g., at some point in
a particular decision-making process, the system has narrowed the
number of possible solutions to X alternatives...). This determination
should be based on operational and human information processing
requirements, not on simple technological capability or practical
feasibility.
For cases in which an Expert System approach is to be implemented, the
designer should ensure that the knowledge base from the subject-matter
expert include demonstrated expert competence, in terms of actions,
safe-guarding procedures, etc., as well as declarative knowledge and
opinions about how experts think and act.
For cases in which an Expert System approach is to be implemented, the
designer should ensure that the number and variety of experts consulted,
and the contexts in which these experts are observed, be adequate to
develop a representative model of the "expert."
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Integration of the Automated System with Other Systems
When an automated system is implemented as a component of an aircraft's
onboard avionics suite, it necessarily interacts with other components to
achieve functional utility. These interactions can range from simple data
transfers to complex command and control relationships, whatever the nature
of these interactions, their effective execution is essential to advanced aircraft
operations. As such, design decisions affecting the functional integration of
such component systems must be carefully and thoroughly considered by the
designer. To this end, the following guidelines are offered.
Integration among onboard systems for enhanced performance
System integration schemes should be designed such that crew members
are not the sole means of data input, data transfer, etc., between
functionally related systems (e.g., Data Link and the Flight Management
System). In general, direct system-to-system data transfer (with
appropriate user interface, etc., safeguards in place) should always be
possible.
Relevant timing, accuracy, speed, and format requirements for
retrieval, transfer, processing, and updating should be compatible
between functionally related systems.
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Where advantageous and safe, all related data bases should update
adequately to fully support mission, user, and system design
requirements. Moreover, such updating should, in general, be "hot" --
that is, data common to several data bases should be updated in all data
bases automatically whenever it is updated in one. This characteristic
extends to also include the hot updating of the products of any
computations, etc., generated from the relevant data.
In cases where related systems utilize extensive and/or critical amounts
of the same data, the designer should consider having the systems share
one data base or at least integrate the (partially) redundant data bases
for use as mutual backups.
Integration among onboard systems for improved safety
In all cases of shared data (or shared products of that data), reliable and
accurate safeguards regarding error detection, and error propagation
must be continuously operational.
The design of any automated system should endeavor to adhere to all
recognized avionics development standards regarding that system's
integration with other systems, including any standards concerning
processing or computational redundancies, etc.
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The designer should consider providing some degree of functional
redundancy among related systems to enable the component systems to
perform cross-checking and backup functions. Such capabilities might
also be employed in compensatory routines responding to degraded
performance, malfunctions, etc. Whatever the use of such functionally
redundant capabilities, the source (i.e., the system) responsible for any
calculations, estimates, etc., must always be readily apparent to the
crew.
Integration schemes should be designed such that they maximize the
probability that vital functions of the aircraft's systems will continue to
perform (at some level of adequacy) when related component systems
partially or completely fail.
Integration schemes should be designed such that, in the event of partial
failures, malfunctions, etc., every functional level of degraded operation
retains essential flight and navigation functions (even if this is at the
expense of other capabilities). That is, system integration, even in
degraded modes, follows a function prioritorization that preserves
essential functions at all costs.
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Integration with ground-based systems
The design of the automated system should consider critical features of
ground-based systems with which it must communicate. These features
can include: Data transmission formats, protocols, and baud rates;
transmission and other physical characteristics (e.g., periodicity of
message transmission over Mode S data link); and possible sources of
error, malfunction, etc.
• The design of the automated system should be such that it does not
depend solely on ground-based data for essential functions.
The design of the automated system should be such that it does not
overburden, impede, or otherwise lessen the overall utility of the
ground-based system.
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